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INTHODUCTION 
This th&ai.s is an analysis of DesGal."tes· doctr.tne on the 
~()le of the vrlll L'"l bie $oltd;ion to the probl_ of error. In 
general t we inten4 to gi VEl a sympathet.;i.e analysis of his po81-
rt1on.and then to cO!ls1der its di£!1culties. both internal and 
~x:ternal.. IJ:herEi seem to be two in:t;ez·ne.l ditiicul ties in his ex"", 
tplanat.1o:n. ot tu."'l'or. (1) Desoartes' pUJ."POse in bI'.1ng1ng th. will 
into the question of errQr wu to avoid plaoing the bl_8 tor 
e1"roron God. The qU$stio.u,. how&ver~ is whether or not he 8..¢-
coapl:1.shed. hia P\U"'pcuse" (2) The second di.f'ticulty i.e whether or 
not .~O%'is aotual.ly apt: ou.t of tneintellect, although Dea-
eartse continually .statea that the will and not the intellect i8 
the ¢aU$'$ of error. 
In consideX'in{~ the extex'l'lal d1:t:tieulti$8 of his :polS! tion, 
~e shall ti.ud it neoessary to evaluate Desoartes on the following 
t>oints ot his doctr1ne~ (1) D$$carte$ holds that the under-
standing 1s passive. (2) Although he places truth in Judgment, 
jud,pent is tQr h1.m prim.ar1~ an act or the will, (p) He hol.ds 
that er;r:or is in judgment &lld t hence, primarily an act of the 
nll.For Descartes t theory of jud@.;ment states that the will 
1 
2 
judges (affirms or denies) what 1$ presented to it by the .unde~ 
standing. (it) lie bases his explanation of judgment on clear atld 
dist1nctldeas. (5) He sees no difte.ranc.6 'between consent and 
assent. (6) DeSC£lrtes says that the will is most tree when it 
1saompelled, by God or by a olear and distinct idea, to a..Beent. 
(7) And finally, he denies that God concul's in a raistaken judg-
ment because erroX' is a pri vat1.Qn and not areal -being. 
In genertU'tour pro4ed~wi.ll be as follows. In what ,re-
ma.iJl$ of' the introduotion .e shall present a brief summary ot 
Descartes J philosophy.. This $~ will be necefJu,ary for three 
reasons. First of all, stteh asWIll1lrur,y will tie togetller the 
tb::cee main works o£ J)e:sc~tes whioh w111 be used in this t.hes:1.s1 
,/ 
1)i$.~smn i! la .yttin~t ~~t4tiiO:p.!1 ~ .PEi~8r Ph1lo!9pbia, &t'J.d 
l:~a.1 ~.19IO~ (EiD ~t a l~lM1oa:~;1! Osumi~1o~i 
1_,).1 The s~, therefore, wil.l tend. to give greater 
un! ty·to the presentation, and will halp us a.void th. n.ecessi ty 
0:£ 8~art1!).g ldll!lldias!:l!. Seeondly,.many basio points ot D.$:-
cartes f generaldoetrine will be &xpla1ned in the s:~, which 
will b. referred to but Mt explained in. 'the thesis 1 tsel!' .. 
Thi$w111 help make the p.r-e'ae1ltation 1lOr$ 1ntel11gible... And 
finally.. th:i$ summary will be a Cartesian introduotion to the 
pl.'lIObl$:m 01" erro:t"t aine& we ahall try to orienta:te it to the 
quest.ion of error. Prom tb.1$ SUJmrUll.ry one will 'be able to see 
f .b!t 
:; 
clearly why eX';t'or was sueh a problem for Desoartes. In the last 
part of the introduction, a£ter the $l.1lII.mEU"y is completed, we 
shall rater to the opinions of three oonmtente:twrs who also point 
out wby Descartes waS driven. by the foundations of his philo.so-
phy. to uplain error, andwby .h1.s philosophy made it a diffi-
cult problem to solve. 
Chapter 2 will con1'ain a. gel'l.eral. textual. analysis of what 
D$:soar1ies propose$ in th$ M.e~~~i~ g,uK~a and ?~aJ\s1Ja1a (E!a 
E~~!)on the solution to the problem ot error.. Tcla w.Ul be 
followed in ohaptex' ~ by a closer analysiS of his notiQns ot the 
'U!l4ers~and1ng, will, en4. dudgment. A clear knowledge ot these 
three cQnc~:pts is lleeessary to properly locate the will in the 
queation of ell"l"Or. Although the matter £01' the second chapter 
will. betaken exc.lus1vely .from the works of De$cartes, we shall, 
in the 'IIhird and .!ourth chapters, also use the various eommen-
tariea on Descartes wn&nevsX' th~ are helpful. Ohapter 1+ will 
eQntaina further analyai s of' erx'or ovel=' end above the textual 
analysi S ot ehapter 2. In th1.$ chapter we shall flee ole~ly how 
Desoartes explains an erroneous judgment as an act or the will. 
Then in chapter 5 we shall end with an evalua·tton of 'tille exter-
rlal and .i.ntern&.l di.t::ticulties of Descartes t doctl.~1n.. 
In the bodyot the thesis. chapters 2. 3. and 4, as well as 
in th. introductory summary, we shall try, as tar as posel1;>le, 
to let Descartes spe.ak for himself.. .:.,'or it seems that if we did 
no,t allow ~)eseartes to prefHmt his owndootrine as he saw it, 
4-
he reader would not be able to understan.d very clearly what was 
escartes and what was ou~ interpretation of him. So perhaps it 
11 be better to lend a sympathetic ear to the .French p.hiloso-
an,y criticism. as WEi go along, except in a. footnote 
when it seems advisable. Once we understand elearly what 
actually trying to s,y, we can criticize him in a separate 
(5) ooncerning those points which. seem to need criticism. 
In his youth Descartes found that only mathematics gave him 
satisfaction because of the certitude which he d.istinctly 
clearly found in it;2 and as tor the philosophy he learned 
rom his Jesuit teaohers, his comments are anything but tavor-
ble.3 He wondtred that such a vast superstructure of knowled.ge 
s built by men of the sohools on such a nak and invalid set ot 
stulates. w,bile tht:tr$ was no superstruoture built upon the 
ound postulates Qf mathema.tios.4 So he decid.ed 'to start trom 
he bottom, tor how ean he take anything tor granted tbat he has 
.2 '" / Rene Desea;rtes., Di,.sCOll:t"J:1 M rameth9de.. Oeuvres de D ...El,!-
as trans" Adam &, Tannery (J?--ars t 1904 j , v!, ? • It Ii me .f'oiiii~$OiiiioloOlS su.rtout aux MathematiquEhl, a cause de Is. certitude f',:: de 
• euidenoe de leurs rai sons., ,. 
3;reid.., !!li' 8-9. ule", ne di~ .I'1en de la Philo$oph1e .. sinon 
U8, voyant quelle a eate oult1uee par les plus exeellena es-
rita qui ayent vasou depuis plusieurs siecles. &. que neanmoins 
1 M sfy trouue eneore aUCUlle chose dont on ne dispute, &. par 
onsequent qui ne soit douteuse •• ,.Cfest pourquoYt aitost que 
'aage me permit desort1r de la euiation de mes Precepteurs, 1e 
u1tta:;y int1erement It estude des lettres. l! 
4lbid't p_ 7. • ••• • 1e m'estonno1s de os que, leurs i"ondemens 
ste.ns" sI te~lle$ & 8i solideSt on nfauoit rien basti dessus de 
1 .. tt 
yet le~lrned t sincE! these pril1Ciples have led him and others into 
all sorts ot talse cC'::lclusiollS? He decided. there.fore" to dis-
card all OpiniOI1S, even his OW!l, and to start from trlings that 
t: 
are clear and. distillCt.':> The me-thad he ehooses to follow is 
fOl.'med upon t};e firm and solid model furnished b:y mathematics .. 
He ela1ms, moreover, that his method is superior to .ll.t1.stotelian 
laglo, i.l1.o1uding even the time-honored syllogism, since this tool 
does not help him. to acquire any new knowledge ~ From the very 
start t therefore f Descartes l'AS found grounds der~ing an ex-
planation of erl"OX'. f)1nc~ error is m.an1testly prevalent in. 
philosopf'!y, he immedia.tely, although implicitly, must ask him-
salt': What is the nature and cause ot error? 
. He exp 11 ci tl;r oonc.erns h1mself with error in his logical 
rulest whiCh are means o:lavoiding error in his illvestigation., 
R1sp.r'1.naiples of logiC are: (1) to recei va nothing as true 
~eh j.s not evidentl;y known to be auch, by its presenting it-
selt to the mind with a clearn..s$ and distinetness which uolud.e 
all doubt,(2) to divide. as far a.s possible, everyd1.r.rioult 
~rQble;m into its natural parts; (3) to conduct one's thoughts in 
~u..order, advancing gradually :from the more simple a..ndftsy tb 
ithe more compl$x and diffioult, and to suppose a definite order 
5;tb.~. ~ p .• 16. 
. 'W t p. f ,it. :u~ prl.s ga"i'U.e que, pour a .LogJ..que, ses 6~ 17 It • • ..... ..:1 1 ... 
syllo . $mEte &: Is. piu.apart de ses a.utres instru.ctions seruent 
plutost a ex,pli.quer a aut~ les choses qu'on s.9ait. ou mesme ••• 
sans ju.g_ent, de celles qu·on ignore, quta les apprendre." 
6 
for the sake of orderly progress ·0£ the investiga.tion.. even when 
none su·cll. is supplied in the natul.'e of the sub(ject to be in'Ves-
t1.gated; and (4) by oompleteness in enumerations and oompl.eteness 
in reviews tb make sure th...a.t nothing has been overloolced.7 
Descartes g08S on to enumeX'B.te certain etLieal rules, 
adopted by him provisio!lal.lYf . that iS t until he could. work out s. 
sa.tisfactory moral philosophy. The first is to tollow the laws 
and customs o:f his country. to hold fast to the religion in whicn 
he has "'been educated, a.nd alwE\ya in practioal lite to follow the 
llloet moderate and most generally received maxims. l1he second 
requires consistency in action; and the third. lXloderateneas in 
his d.emands in 1'$$p60t to external E~ood,s. By the foul."th he re ... 
solves to dedioa.te his lite to the cultivation ot his reason. 
p 
and to the discovery of scientific t~ut.hs. U The first moral 
ma::!tim, although it wilJ. not solve the problem of error i'~"o:m the 
specu.lative standpoin.t, will '.b.elp him. avoid ettor in practical 
... "eryday- 11 v1:o.g ... 
In the fourth and filth sections of tlte .DisgouX'! q,t ~ 
" Se,ihod! Descru.."tespresents outlines of the doctrine wbich he de-
velopea in the M!dita.tioni~ andPrincip1a. In the ~il5i:JatCiuone$ 
he seeks to demonstrate the e:ld.stenee of God and the existence 
ot the soul as an independellt entity, separa.ble from the body .. 
.' 
. t f. 
'7Ibi~. , pp. 18-19. 
B 22-28. Ibid.. , pp. 
-
? 
Although these two point, seem to be his main purpose in writing 
the Med.1tationet!J; it is lvortby of note that a whole meditation 
(IV) 1$ devoted to the question of truth a...1'1d erx:or. 
In the first medita.tion he shows us that all things may be 
doubted, exoept the ;fact tl:l3.t we doubt. And since doubting is a 
kind. of thinld.ng, we cannot d.oubt that We th.i:nk.. He must have 
all Ids principles on a secure baSiS, but, si:nee the op1ntons he 
has already accepted have at titleS led hirJl e.atra.1',9 sinoe his 
senSes have at ti:mes deceived :hi!r.~ 10 and since dreams deceive him 
as well, 11 he must doubt o.t all these t:b~ngs until !'.e has proved 
them true or fa.1se. He even say-s that his imperfection !night be 
so great that he is e,lways deceived. 12 eut since be does tbink, 
and since h$ is able to doubt , he must at least; exist, Thecre-
tors, "I exist'" is a,lwa.:ys true. l ; Ani! with this we have entered 
.flt 
91_~. I. A.T., VIr. 17. ·,Animadvert! ,janlante aliquot annos 
quam mUI'i'a, ineunteae.ta.te. tusa pro varia adi:;.,i13ex'im f & quam 
du'bi.a s.1nt quaecunque ietis postea superextruxi, ae proinde fun-
di tus omnia stmel in vi. ta esse evex:'teooa.atque a primis lunda-
mentia clenuo incboandum, s1 quid aliquando .f'irmwn Sk mt!UlSuruI!l 
oupiam in seient1is atabilire. It 
lO~q~~:t t !>.).8. HUem.pe quidquid hactenus ut maxime vex"Um. 
adm.isi,v6_ a sensibua, vel per sensus accepi; 110S aut. 1nter-
dum fallers deprehendi.. ac prudentiae est nunquam 11U$ :plane 
confiders g.ui nOB vel semel deceperunt.!I 
11 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
12Ib!d. t p. 21. 
1 "iii: 
.?l,led. il, A.T. t VII. 25. rlAdec ut, omnibus satis superque 
pensitatri, a:'inique statu.em.um slt hoo pronuntiatum, fog $WXtt 
.w Sas!;atSh quoties a me protertur, vel menteconcipiw:'. neaes-




the second meditation. 
:J:'his process of methodical doubt is. in4l.eed, radical. But 
it certainly shows us to what ext:eeme lengths Desc4s wa.s 
willing to go in order to achieve ceFtitude,. to a.void error. 
In the third mooi tat10n Descartes treats the subj act 0.£ our 
knowledge of God. He thinks that he oan first; formulate a prin-
ciple which will assUl'"G him of the certainty ot thingfill. I t is 
the principle which he dar! ved experimentall;y from the prooess of 
aSlSerting his own existeno.e. Since he has clearly and distinctly 
conce! ved thn t he truly ex1 Glia. he can now la:y down tn.a genaral 
rul.e for asserting the certainty or 8117 idea; :i.E the conception 
is clear and diatinct • it is true. 14 This rule would be talse 
only i1' there were some POfll'ful being t superior to himself f who 
deceives him in all things. 80 he must destroy the possibil.ity 
o~ sueh a. d&ceiver .. 15 Again we see Descartes obsesa~ with a 
qu·&st tor certitude, wi til au. attempt to avoid error. which ,we 
might add; is altogether pra.iseworthy.. Although he has not yet 
explle1.tl,. &xplai.ned the nature and cause of error, ~ can see 
that he l'!'lUst.. And in treating of ttle C8.w;'J.e of er:ror he must show 
how this cause CM be overoome so that he can avoid error. 
De.cartes begiI1s his investigation of the knowledge we pos ..... 
14!e4. III, A.iT., VII, 35. *' .... 8.0 proinde jam. videor -pro 
regul.e. gensrffi posse statueret i11itd OWlS esse verum, quod 
valdeelare & distincte ·perclpio. If 
15f.b~ •• p. 36. » ••• quamprimum ooeurret oocasio, examinare 
d.eb~o an ·t D$Us . &. si sit an P9sait esse deceJ)tor~. hac aniIn re1~'1l0ra a, non ~l.a&or de U11& al.l.8. p~an$ ¢ertus &.$se \uiquam posse 
sess 01' God by considering his own mind. Ris thou.ghts are 
either images of things.16 acts of the 'rill of judgments. Ideas. 
moreover, are innate, or they oome !rom without, or they are 
found a.s tormed hy -the thinker himself .17 But how do we knoW' 
whether an idea represents a real thing external to us'? His an-
swer is that d1fterent ideas have a: different measure or objec-
tive reality, that is, they participate as representa:tiva bages 
in J.~igher or interior degrees of beinf§ or perfection.18 .: 
~{1 th tl1is as a baokground,Des<tartes can .now prove the exis-
tence ot God" }!'or him the idea. of $ub$tanee ha.s more reali ty 
than the idea ot acoident; and the 1(lae. of an in£111i te t eter11a.l, 
unehange:able, oID.lllse1ent. om:n1potent being, the crea.tor ot all 
fini 'bEt things t has more ideal real! t:r than the ideas that repre-
s-ent substances. Now there ean be no more reality in the e.tf'eot 
than in the oompletf:!f qause J the cause must oontain the $:a.m.e 
:f\&alities or reali ti&8 superior to those that are in the efl.'ect •. 
Sinoe I am .finite, the idea of an intin1te substance could no't be 
in m~t if this idea did not come trom a really existing in.tlnite 
stl:bstanoe.19 Desoartes gives other tU."guzm;mts :for 'bhe .r.tstEmce· 
1611>1<1.. Pill 37. '* .. t .nuibus solis 'nT'oprie conv.ani t ideae 
..t r I '" ~ 
nom-ell .... 
17 Ibid. , 
18101d• t 






of C4Xl, but it will not serve our purpose to go intotheo all 
here. 
But this p:t'esents Descartes with a ra:ther difficult problem 
As we shall seGin the next ohapter, he shoWS that C'TOd is vera ... 
o1Qus, and that a1~ our £ao11lt1&8 come trom the God whose exis-
tence he has just proved. But it our tacntlties come .from God t i 
wou.ld ~eem tn,at he deceives us by allovd.ng oU.r faculties to err .. 
And. $0, Descartes must somehow reoonoi.leou.r God-given faoulties 
which sometimes err, with the veraoity of God. 
W. shall not discuss the fourth meditation here since this 
is tIte sub3ect matter for a luge part o~ the next chapter. The 
futh medi tatiotl takes uptbe nature of material. things and 
proves I)·noe more the existenoe ot God; so we need not go into 
t111s m~i tat ion either .. 
In the sixth meditation Descartes concludes trom the olear 
and distinct knowledge we haiVG of extension and of bodies, and 
fA"om our distinct eOrlsQ1ousneas of ideas d.t$crmine4 by an exter-
nal and material cause, that bodies really exist. and t:tat we ax' 
not d.c~ived in our idea of a material world. For, it thi$ were 
20 not the ea.se, the ground ot our deception. would be God. On 
the other l.t.and, the sEmea.tiol1s o£ color, sound, taste. ete .. t and 
tUSf.) pain and ploasu:t'8 t are 'Vi$WeQ. by him as merely subj active .. 
Yet. from the fact that we have a. clear and distinct idea of 
;' t. 
11 
ourselves as a thinking substanoe t 21 and since in this idea no 
reJ}resentation of an;ytbing material is oontai.n,ed, Descartes in-
;t'el."S the irA.9pendent eldstenc~ ot our mind trom the body. 22 
In the l~rL"lej.~ia I'hf.~o'~0»!R~e there is a treatment in suc-
cessi va seotions ot. the prinoiples. of humall kno\fledge, th.e prin-
ciples o! material things, 'the visible world, and the earth. 
Theiirat part, which is the part most impo:rtant tor our eOTJsid ... 
eratio!:, is a recapi tulation 01: the principles laid down in the 
Iii;:tdt tatioIl;e,§. though Desca.rtes is more explicit on many pointe 
iu this W'oz-k than he was in the famel" Oiled! ~at1onef!)" 
In ~a.x:! .Pr;ha?, we a:l'."e given a number ot valuable definitioTlS. 
among which are th.e importa.."tt on$S of clearness and distinctness 
III term that clear whioh is pl'es~nta..1ld apparent to an attentive 
m.ind. in the aame way as we uaert that we see objects clearly 
w~. being pre.sent to. the regarding eye, they operatB upon it 
with sll.f'ficJj,ent strength.. But the distinct is that which is so 
preoise and dif£erant .tro~ all other objects that i t eo:r~tains 
23 
within i tmelt nothint~ but wh.fit is clear.1f But if a clear and 
distinct idea is always true, as stated above, we ea..'I'l con.elude 
only that error 1s found elsewhere. So Descartes r~n.lst ansv/er 
the question1 Where is error found? 
21tbid. ~ p. 78, (l1res Gogitans-). 
22Ibid • 
-2~:asne Deaeart~$t The:~hiloBf->l?llical WOrks of Desca;t'ta,~, 
tra.ns, Haldane a:od !1;oss~amtirla:g$. It.15I)~ !, 2"97. 
He defines substance, It By substanoe t we oan understand noth-
ingelse than a th1llg wb.1ehso ~sts ~ha:t:it needs no otruu- thing 
in order to eJd.st. ,.24 He 'then ru.\dsthat only one substance oan 
be oonceiv.a. as plainly needing nothing else in ol:'der to exist. 
namely God; and, thus,substenoe cannot be applled 'both to God 
and to erea.tures in an umvooal m811ner.25 although created sub-
at$tloe can be app11ed uni voca.l17 to both oOl.'POreal and. thinking 
substance.s. 26 From the eGst~c. of any attr1bute we: oan oon-
clude to an existing thi~ or substanoe to which it belongs; but 
everj" $ubstance has a pre-em1nent a'ttrlbute, which constitutes 
its nature and essence. and to whioh all others :r.-elat.. !buSt 
e:x:tel'18i.on in tlu"ee d.imens:i.ons constitutes the nature ot eorpore-
a.l sUbstance. Por eve~ else whiCh can be asoribed to 
b041ea pre$U.ppoae exteXlJ!d.on and is only s.OJlle mode of an ex-
teM.,. bOd.y. Lilt.wise.all things whioh we tind in the m1n4 
(th1.nld.qsubstanoe) ·are s1m.pl3'd1verse modes ot thought.. :r1gu:te 
anet motlon are aod$s of exteuion; 1mag1na'h1on,. sensation. and 
will are modes ot 't~..ought. 27 But it doe. seem strange .. as we 
shaU ••• ;Mar! tun remarking. that a being t whose eSS$Jloe 1 t 1s 
2l1-Haldane and Hess., P. 239. 
25~M.l p, 24. 'tAtqu. ideo nomen substant1aenon oon- , 
ven1t Dec ~ 1 lis .'Jfoee" ut diod. solet 1n Hchol1s, hoc est, 
nulla e~'WI nominis Tiii!!1cat10 pOi:est distincte int'elligi t quae 
Veo & oreaturis sit oommun:i.s. t1 
26Ib1~. t pp. 24-25. 
27Ib1d't p .• 25-. 
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(') think, could ever be subjeot to error. 1'1'118 is another <11If1-
ultypreaentillg 1tseU to D$sea:rtes' solution to the problem of 
Other points ot p~s ~ pertinent to thi.s chapter will be 
uttic,ie.ntly treated in the following chapters; $0 w& need hot EO 
to the h.ere. It 1s wortl'l..;y of note, however, that Deso.a.t'tes 
oncl.udes the Mpgipia b~ saying that he 1s r&ady to submit to 
he authori.ty Qf the OhU1"'Cheoncerning the me:terial he has 
~ted.28 
A;¥1 sow. see trom our swmnat~on ot some .tu.ndamental points 
t D$ooetes f doctrine that eftOr presented .. serious and ditf1-
t ~b.lem :tor l::Lim. H$ was contrented with $~rtand, 'bhere-
o""e. bed to exp.l.:ain it. He pos! ted. logioal wIe& to avoid error 
pectulatlvely .• and monJ. rul.es to avoid error pl."actieally. He 
oleer and distinot ideaa aN alwa;ys 'true, and .. 80 we 
ean besu;bj$ot to erroneous ld$u. Our ,faculties 
'om •. f:rom God. who is not & 4eceiv$r, how tth'Gn is erro~ '.PO$$ib~ 
thout plae1ng any blaae on God? And .f'1J::t.aJ.17 .. how can a think ..... 
$Ubstanc4, a being 'Whoa& e$SOl'lee it is to think,oesubjeet 
Vuiou.s o~ntators have alBo notie.d 'the ke7 po,! tion that 
ap~MtiOtl ot e:tTOr );!..a4 in thaCartes1a.nIO"$tem. Among them 
s h •... Leo Keeler. who states: HDesc:artes 18 the third great 
(atter Plato and st.. Augustine) t tor whom the faot of 
114-
$~Qr rused an important philosophioa:l. p~Obl&m .... 29 And a num-
ber of li,..ltaly answers present themselve.8 to &n$wer the question, 
why? On the one hand. it was Descartes- opinion that error had 
a. wide prev"lenee in neul;r all departments of knowledge. On 
the other hand.. he believed that truth was comparative1." ea.sy to 
aoqutre fOI' tll.1:l.7One with Il Xllature mind. But he saw tbs.t ~l1Y 
pbtlosopher$ were mistak$n in their in.terpretation of the ~bv1-
CUI· faets of fllxperlexu.le,. Why, then" so many mistakes when marl 
eant'eaeh eerttdn knowledge '0,- means of methodical dQubt. a 
ra41&ll. though necessarystratagent in the present circumstances? 
This. method •. as we saw, eonee:ives of all oonvict1ol:1e as doubt-
.tttl· a:na &v&n erroneous until px-oven true.Tb.1s fact J together 
w1.th th$ doct'r1ne of l)flIsearte.e on the passiveness of the intel-· 
le'Ot, 'Whietl we Shal.l discuss later, ma.kes it necessaryf'orhim to 
expNss h1msel! rather tully on the poesibility and nature ot 
errt)X".. Fort it error a.otually exists t thOu.gh not necessari ly , 
he must show hower.ror is possible end in what it consists. 
BU.tl o:the.1" philosophers hav·e let th~ question slEJep; whjr not 
D$sea.rtes? Perhaps there was tL"1oth$l' motive tor ttndertaki.ng a 
$olution to the vexing problem of error. And so there was. 
Sinoe Descartes knew that God cannot deeeive us and is the ulti-
:mate souroe o,f all our olear and distinot ideas, it would seem 
thAt all our ideas are true, an.d cOllsequently, that e,rror is im-
I. t, 
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poas1ble. Desoartes has made divine veracity the cr1terton of 
all oertain knowledge of the outside world; and so he rea.sons 
that an all-wiBe. all-good. and omnislent God would not. rather. 
1\ 
could not give us an intellect and will sub~eot to error when the 
1d&as are clear e.nd distinct. Butt as Keeler remarks, this argu-
ment seems to pro,\re too much; sinoe Descertes Inustask and. an-
swer the question: How could suoh a God give us faoulties that 
are'~ver sttbject to 81"ror130 "The problem of error as posed b7 
Descartes, is. the-relars, a. ~1eular aspect ,ot'the metaphysical 
problem ot evil in the world. u31 
It&$l1ng $xpre8S.. tho tmportan<>e of the problem of el!"rO%' for 
DeSlcl.iWtes in this way: -He ftadilzr sees that the crucial problem 
of epistemology is t·o explain,) not the 1>0$$.1.b111 ty of knowledge. 
but the !>Oasibility ot error. And what he sees eo olearJiy is 
not merely trAt no theory ot truth wEuen fails to provide a 
sati.sfactory theory of error is aooeptable. but the tu;rtl:u,~ 
.tact, that by exam.1niXlg the constitution of erroneous belief we 
shall be laying b.are at the ,same t1lUe the oonstitut1.o11 of know-
ledge., u;2 
Finally. Ma:l;'i tain gj:ves us one more reason w:b;rDesoartes 
mu$t eons;i.,der this problem. Due to the Cartesian conoept1oIl of 
lna:ll as a thinking substance. error raises an almost inElu:perable 
in n 
:;°;tP;Lf1 -1 lh 14·2. 
;lI'b1d • 
. ! .10 4' ~, 
;;as.V~ Keeling •. Desoe.ruea (l.-Ondon. 19~), p. 156. 
16 
1.f'f1eult;y. How is it poss.ible that I should be mistaken, since 
. am a spirit? How ean a substance, whose essence is to think, 
hink wronCi:1y?33 
These are J.! p'£io~~ o~ U ;lsea:'easons whioh demand that Des-
investigate this qUEult1on;:ather thoroughly" There is a1-
obviousd;.e tac1tg ind.icat1on whioh shows that 'this problem 
st have o_n ot the utmotJt im:PQl."tance lo.r hil'l1. Wb,7 elae would 
have devoted a whole meditation (~t!lif.l gU¥:¥I) ani m~ 
seotions of tha.t put of the l)r~o.~ that is eonoerned w1 th 
lll.'ttl1lUl knowledge (.Pus ?rw) to its solution? 
IrQX"' th ••• reasons. 'thex'$fo:t"., we find that \!Wror is a g;rea:t 
:p:t'oblfml for D.e~t$s~ gl.'1Jater~ p&rhe-ps. tor Descar't.;.s than tor 
at othf)r philQsophel.'lh 
Id r • 
Cl1:A.PTER II 
DESOAR1''&S 'OOOTRINE Oli ERROR IN M!l2);~TIO SU,A,af,fA 
MID PRINCl.PlA PHIW.',SOPiUAE (:t'A~. :pR1" ..MA)S "' ; 1 't: r hi r '_ff_I= .......... ==~ ..... · 
A ~a!roAL ANALYSIS 
W. have seen tl).at the problem. or error was extwmely i:tnpol.--
taut for Descartes. and. that it stemmed basically irom his .,-S-
tellt ot philosophy. lifow let us conaider the detailed dOQtr:tne of 
G'X"l:'O,'t' as he presented 1 t in 1Jl;~.~o ~! and ai.ttc1l!!!: ~Jr-
2s"U~W:ie (Klt,@ ,i'l:'.!:M)" This p~se;a.t chapter Will be a $twl\.y ot 
tll$$$ two tens in those p~ts pertinent fro our dis'OU$:$iol'l. of 
el."irOr. :meM.1ttU~o ~t 01: Gour_. is oompletely d&1toted 
to tll. study ot e.rror (and t:ru:bh),. While th.e first pert of the 
~~:e~! is eonoer:ntd with human knowledge in, general; so we 
shall seleQt only tl'loseseetionsot this latter work which will 
el.e.ri1'y and augm.ent th. tamer woX'k., In. geneftl,we shall treat 
.fo~ points: the llatu.re of errQr;, the causes otel:'ror. both r&-
mot~ ·and prold.mat&; euld. the man.tl.Ol' in whiCh De.cart •• removes 
rulYblame for our el.'1'Ora from God. 
fum1ng our at1ientJ.on. th€W, to the tirst point of consid.-
eration. let U$st)~ Desoartes' 4.scription ot error. :He tells 
us in ~e !iim:tie:t19 ~:YIi::ti that tlerNl.' .S suoh 1s not something 
17 
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raal which depends upon God .. but only It detieieney ... l Dist1n-
guislling i'1.u:thsr h' £cutes that -error is not a pure negation 
(that is t. it 1$ not a. simple deficiency or laok ot some pertec-
tion which is not ml1 due).2 but mtheX" a p~ivation (or laok)3 ot 
Bome knowl,edge wtich it seems to me that I should po-SS&as. n4 
This 1s D·escartes' doctrine 011. the nawre of errOTas £oul1d 
error in much the same m.a:tlJler, although here he makes ano·tiher 
d.1$tlr.~ction $flotting that in some sense error is a nagationl 
uTba:t our el"rors in respoot of God are but negations, "h11·s in 
rG$peet to ourselves they ar. privations 01.' defects. u5 The Ha-
son they are llegations as £ar u God is concerned 1sthat they do 
11,ot J:(\}quire the actual assistanJl$ ot God j.n order that thay may 
be: ;produoed.6 .. \nd finally" Descal.'tes adds one further d1stiJu; .... 
tion. \1$ $.aw th.at error is a defeot or privation; but this does 
f J(I J J~H 
.'. IRene De8c~te.s, Med}.tatiLot4s, tl.~e.xlS .. :L.J •. :La:E'leur (l:iew York, 
1951). p. 49. 
2The clause "n!est pas 1e 51:mp10 de:,(aut 0\1 manquement de 
quelq.u.e . peri'actiQ 'lui ~e. m 'est po~nt ~euef: is not found in the 
Original Latin.. (Cf ... ~. l.Y, A. T ... , .LX. 43~.·) 
3The phl"a.se It a1 va earEmt1a It is not f'ouM in the French 
translation.. (cr. !Y~ed. ll. A. T •.• VIr, 55.) 




not mean tor lUm that it is a 4.t.~t in our nature; 7 for if this 
were true, we would have no poasd.btl1t'y of exonerating God. sioo. 
He would 1nthis case have given usa. detective natlJ.:re.. Altho'tlgh 
our $rrors are not detects ot our nature, they are I'the detects 
of our mode ot dtion. n $ Andthl..s mode of aotion that causes er-
a 
ror is .,. the manner in. which we 'Use our .freedom. It '" 
Raving seen how Descartes discusses the nature d: error, ~et 
US proceed to oonsider the oauses ot error. In Med"1t,,tio ~1;a 
and the ~:rine1p'i.! (E!!:! Prlp,s..) he treats the proxima:oe causes ot 
erI'l)r, namely t the 1dll md un4uBtanding.. But .turther on in. 
the n1nci]!ia he discusses the remote causes or so'tU"Oes ot error. 
It i.e to the r&oote ·soux-ees10 tbat we nO'w turn our attention • 
.AlthQugh the ~ox1mate 08.\1." ot error are not the primax.-y con-
oern of thi.s thesis, it is M$essa'!."Y also to allow Deses.rtes to 
po1ntaut what he oonsiden the 1'$m.ote sources of ~or to be. 
They are foul' in n'Ulttbe%t= (1) prejudiceso:f ch11dhood; (2) the 
faO't that we cannot ,forget .bout these Fejud1ces.; (;) that .. 
be$ome fatigued b:y attJ:ltl41.ng to thoa$ objeots wh10h are not pr' ..... 
1.1 • 
?IbMlt p. 254« 
8Ib~d. 
9fbidit 
lOAlthough Desoartes does not use the distincti.on between 
remote and pro~ima.te caw.;es of error, the disti.l.1.clticn seems to 
be -valid.. He refers to theae .tour causes as eauses;we might, 
nevertheJ.ess. consider them as rellloie s,qu¥c,es of eJ."ror, to dis-
tinguish t~em from the uro~ms:t,e 9us!.~ 0 error, the will 8.lld 
und~rstandi;ag., 
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sented to the senses; and (4) that we attaoh our thought to worda 
which do not exPress thjm with aoou%'t.cy t 
Now let us analyze these foul' remote souroes more thor-
oug1'>..ly, 
1) t1 (TJhe principle <lause of error is tou..nd in the preju-
dices of ohildhooa.. ,,11 Due to the faot tr..a.t i:n _rl,., life the 
mind was so thoroughly bou.nd to the body. it attended to noth11l.g 
exoept thoughts by w:b..ich it :perceived objects that mad.e impres-
sions on the bod,y. As 7~t the mind did not refer t.bese thoughts 
to anythi.:ng e:.rlst;1ng beyond itself. The mind simply felt pain 
or pleastu"e t or sensations t whioh ar& reJ!l'essntatd.ons oJ: nothing 
ou.tside the mind .. and wl".1.ch vary as the body is a£feeted. Later 
on,.b.ovrever, when tIle body followed what vias harmful or benef! .... 
ci~;.l, the r~ind. which Vias at.ill closely oonnected to the body., 
refle·e,ted on the objects it pursues or avoids, and.remt3.rk~d tor 
th$ .:r;ix'st time that theyexl$t outside i t.sal!'. Therefore. 'the 
mind attributed to tha$~ objects magnitude, fiEllre. col(,'r, taste, 
and m~ other qual.ities. p" f'irst judged that the:r.'e~'as f,;reate.r 
orl&s.s ~eal1ty in eao.h objedt as the il'npress1on it O.(;lU8:eS on t 
bo();;y we-a lItore or less pov/srful. For 1rl£~ta.rlce, the mind is led 
to believe that tll.ere is lrLOre substance in roeks than in air. 12 
:L'i.kewise. our mind has been tilled with so ma,n.y other such 
prejudices frolll infancy.. which we later accepted wi thout su..ffi-
U Haldane a.nd Hoss, p. 249. 
12 
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cient explanation., and e.d.l:aitted as possessing -truth and elear-
n.$$, as it they had been known by our a_nses or :Lmplanted in us 
by nature.. But as a JIlatter 01.' fact t in early life we knew things 
clearly, perhaps, but eerta.:J.ruy not d.19tinatly.l, 
2) "(~ he second. cause of our errors is that we cannot fo1"-
I~gt tljese PNjUdioes.:,14 Although in later life, when the mind 
is no longer Wholly subjedt to ~"le body t an~$ no longer in the 
habit of ra.t.'en-ing objects to the body. it seel;;s, instead, to 
inves't1.ga.te the truth of things in thef:1sel1tes. And so t in this 
WIJ!.t"!I we observe a great m.an;y judgm.ents we have !!la.de in early life. 
Still. it is $Xtremely diffiou.lt to 61&9.1" our memory of these 
judf?:~.!llEH1t$; a!'A. as long as they remain there t they are the sourcel 
of error. l5 
It 1s necessary, th.erefore. to clean up our mel.no~t as it 
weri.. Foz' the matu.rethinkar oa;n apprehend thing$ more clearly 
and·d,i$tinctly WhO has had fewer prejudioes, or who has succeeded 
in riddi:nr~ his ltl$ll1orjt o£ them .. 16 
~) 11 [rr] he third cause is that 01..lX' ntnd !atigue.s itself when 
it applies 1ta attention to the objects which erellot presen.t $.0 
the $ens~a .. n 17 Il:he mind caru.tot atter::.d toarry object for arry 
iU. I ' .. , q If 






length ot tue without suttering pain and fatigue. If tv-!s is 
true about any object. it is even .or. true about objects which 
are not present to tke senses or imagination. 18 
Thus it happens 'that lIan.'Y e.re unable 1;0 conceive ar~ 8ub-
a"tia.'I'loe'W'll.es_ it is Qerporeal or imaginable, and ."..nsenslble, 
althQugh thel"e are many objeot. thav are 1nt.elli.g1b.le which are 
not imaginable. And $0 they ar$ persuaded that there 1$ no boq 
which 1$ not sensible:. But since W8 perceive no object su.ch aa 
i.t 18 by smse 8loIUl~ bUt- only by reason exeroised upon sensible 
objects, it happEl'lU\ that the majority of m~ peceive nothing ell:" 
cep 1%1 a contused manner.19 
4)~. tounh ca11$$ 18 that .. attach our concepts to woms 
which 4.0 not aOO'U1'atel,. 8lUJ'W$J;t. to the real! ty. "20 In Q.rder to 
speak ftat1iaoh all ou» conoeptions to words which ~re$s them, 
an4 ··comm1t to memo17 tbought. in aonn$",t1on with the$& words. 
Lat.,r on we find it Hsier 1;0 ~$Oall the word$ than. th.ethinga 
s1gn1t1e4 by thtut t .an4 $0 cBnoonoei VEl) notr.J.ng we ooncei ft 1d. th 
vbat.; 41st1netness necessBll'.Y to aepuate w.hat \'1$ oono&:I.:". from the 
woX!de u.s.a. to expJNtS$ our conoeptions. :f?or this reason, many 
attend ~o WO~8 rather than to things, and oontent ~be$selves to 
aas~t to terlns without knowing ,just exactly what they mean. 21 
18;t9t1d• 
19t:l!ara· 




We shall sea in the next chapter that we err when the will 
passes judgment on some thins that is not olear.ly and distinctly 
perceived. And the tact that something is not olearly and d1s-
tinotl,. perce! ved result$ from the four reasons tlOt. above_ 
Ti'or this reason, the1"8f'ore, we can designate thes$ four factors 
as the tour main rel!1ote sources Qf ~or. But clearly, these 
four remote sourcas would have no immediate e1' feet were there no 
~oxima.te causes Of' error. ~Vhell Desoartes $xam.1nes &rror more 
o.10.$e1,.. he tells us that it arises from two jointeauses, tithe 
facu.lty of knowing • it • and the faeulty of choice, or rathar ot 
frea will.,.22 
Let us oonsider first the faculty of knowing-the undel'-
st'anCU. ng.. It [I!/" the underata.ndr:tng alone (I ne1 thel- as.en nor 
detlT an:y1;h1ng. but)!? I oIl.ly conceive the ideas of th1ngs wtd.eh 
I awi;1 assert or deny. Nor (in oonsidering the u.nderstandiJ1g thu 
pr~ieely)24 oan we $&y that; 8l'lJ" erro~ 1* ever touri1 in 1t.,.25 
In the l.l.4M!»i,8 he tells U8 the part played b7 the underatalld1ll@ 
when he $8.78: "I a.dmit that we can 3udge of nothing unless our 
t I 
22u~&,a!1!Bth LaFleur. p., 5<). I'ta tacul"tate coposeendi ••• 
a tac,ulir e eIgeIidi ai va ab arbi trii Ubertat~h ft !.!A.ll. A" f., t 
VII. 56. 
2~The clause tti8 nJasseure ~ Xl$ nie auoune chOEH~1 mUs" is 
not found in the orig1na.l Latin. ( Of. I.d... lIt A. T .. t Vii. 45«) 
24Th• phraa$ "en 1. (entendement) eons1derant ansi presle$'-
ment tl is nnt found in the original Latin. (Of. 1})111,") 
25Jli!41!A!iQS!, LaFleur, P .. ;0. 
24 
ers'tand1ng is .made use of, because there is no rea.son to.up-" 
ose we can juQ.gEJot what". in no 'ldse appx-ehend .. "26 The c1udg-
see in our next point t 1s plaeed by the will. 
thus the understanding ha$ a minor; though necessary role to 
in .%TOr. It baa no &4tive part to play, but 1s a passive 
tn'PlA,.,..w..ul.si'tie 1nso far as the will passes judgment on, what the 
.• retanding percei vea. obscurel,.. 
What t then, is the role of the will in error? Bw! first at 
let 11S COnsider the nat'Ul."e of the will. In com~1sQn with 
h. understanding, this ftteul11y is i._neely greater thtm the 
im1tfl4 unde.;ostanditng. 27 .. ( [~IS a _tt.l' of tact )26 I a~rt.nQ. 
(it. to be so ~pl •. e:ndmended)29 that; t.hen are no l11lJ.1ta whieh 
reatr1ct it •• :;0 i'U:r:'tmer on. 1n this part ot M:~.tlt~oiu.a.r.t;a 
e.tih)~. d..fines tn. nature of the will in the following mannert 
"F.~ it consist. only tn the .tact that " e:an (make a choice; we 
can);;l do a given thing oX' not do 1t~that 18 to say, we can. a.f'-
ira or 4_1'17. pureue or &'Vo14. O~ more properly. our frae will 
~82ldan. and Ross, p~ 233., 
27f~"t$'$.toYt LaFleur, p. 51. 
28Th, phra.. ,. Enl. ef'tetU is not 
(0£. 1!!l- !I. A.T •• lX, 45 .. ) 
29~~ .ords »1(e) s1 vague & s1 
the orlg1nal Latin~ (Ct. Ibid.) 
30!!4iif.t10nl. LaFleur~ Pi 51. 
found in the or1gi.nal Latin. 
./ .. 
enteXldue'· are not found in 
31The phrase t.tfa,i.re une QAQse lt is not :found in the ol.'ig1nal 
Lat1tL. (Ot. Mf4. II, A.T. t IX, 46.) 
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consists only in the rut that in a£ :firming or denying, pursuing 
Qr avoiding the ttdngs suggested b7 the understanding, we behave 
in such 9. ~. that we do not teel. t.hat ~ external. :toree has 
const'raill1itd our deoision. n ,2 
However, $.1nc.e the POwel:' ot wi.Uing comes from God t and 
sinn. it is perfeat in it. own right, Descartes ~gu •• "~t the 
ea.us. o.f m:y errors 1s not tile power ot willing (oonsidered by ito-
saUl. '3d 34 And tor th.same reason the und'$rstanding is u.ot 
the. callse ot error ,,,hen 1. t 1s considered in 1. tsel.t. 35 FQ~ even 
1;hough the understanding is llmited in its range, i11 is perfect 
in, th1a respect that flever:yth1ng I ocnceive I eonc.iV$ properly. 
. . . 
and· it 1s.~ posaible tor •• to be uceived in that res:peet.,,;6 
Sinoeem.'Or du.s fiot a.r1n .from the w1l1. norfwm th$ poweJ 
of eoac.e1V1ngt considered in 1:thciml$elves, Deseartes logically 
uk$ ll1muU whe 4luu.t1Qnt lfWbenee. then, do ln7 errors U1se,?··'? 
And· tbe .-r that ~i.tel\r follows 1s that erl"Or arises 
Ii.flf>ont the fact that the will is (m.uch):;a more ample and far-
L .1 II an , 
~ME;t.u.Raf' LaFleur, p. .51. 
"!l'lle llhrase flpe~ ae apeetatmn ,. is not f'oundin the French 
tranala.'t:ion_ (ot.!!I\_ IIt A.T;;, VII, 58.) 




,8The word "beaueouptt ;J.s not found in the original Latin. (Ot.. Mad.. n. A. T... IX. 46.) 
26 
reaching than the understanding, so that I do not restrain. it 
within the same limits but ext$ld it even to those things which I 
do not understand. It ,9 In the !l'ti;ns.:\;ei! Desoa.rtes oites the same 
rea.son for error when he states: tlFurther, the p:Etl!'eept.ion of the 
understand.ing only extendS to the few objects which present them.-
selves to 1 t, and is alftYs very limited. Ifhe will, en the other h.._. 1.'flS:Y in some measure· be sa14 to 'be infinite. " to" 80 that 
we-easily extend. it beyond that which we apprellend clearly. And 
when w. do this there is no wonder if it happens that we are de-
ee-1v$d: • ..40 
To sum up what we have said thus .tar on the proximate 
callUS Qf' error. we can :re1'er to a. seotionol the PrtnpiRia al-
:ready 01 ted l WhceN Vie f'ou.n4 Deaoartes saying that tf our errors 
U". d.;teots of our mode of action. tt41 The mode ofaetion is the 
us.-, or rather t the misuse. o~ the ft.ll in making a ;Judgment on ... 
what is not elearl~ and di$t1notly perceived by the un4er-
stand1ng. 
There remains one f'inalpo1nt for our Gona1deration, and 
that 1.6 to explul1 the manner in whioh Descartes remOVes all 
blame tor our eno~s from God. St&.rting the ~edi.1fa!1~ .~~t! 
he demonstrates 'h.$ existence of' God, eoncluding: -An4 from the 
ill ) 
"9lYI.~tat10n!t LaFlellrt p. 52. 
4{)Hal.dane and Ross, p. 233. 
41~'bid. t p.. 2;4., 
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very-fact that such an idea OCQUN in me, or that 1 who posaess 
this idea exist" I so ~1dently conelude" that God exiats and that 
my own existence depends entirely upon him evex-YIDoment of my lite 
that I am confident that the human Illindcan]mow nothing with 
greater evidence and certainty .. n42 Due to this l.Ulbounded con-
fidenoe in the absolute certaint:;r of th. providence o£God, Des-
cartes must olearly ex:tablish the fact that G·od. can in :no wise 
decaive :r.a.a%l by causU:tg h.Ln toe,rr. For, if we so 0.$,1'&00 upon 
God every m.oment of ou We, the realization that. God' would. 0.1' 
$V$neould. decei ... us, would oertainly destroy am::! l'aith in the 
prov1d,ence and goodness o£' God. If erro,rstelIl.$ from God , wha't-
:t'Ieoourse is lett tor 'the philosopher but $ceptioianlo~ agnosti.-
o1:sm1 It God oan deceive UJih .e must eon elude tl::t.at He, C~ 4e-
ee:3:ve U$ in ,an;rth1ng. ThereJ'o,l'$. no matter how oonfid,f>ll't on. is 
t:ha't150111et:P~i.ng iseertain, aven i! one has a clear and.. d.istinot 
1d'$" •. he nm,st withhold Ms .tim assent becaulle th~ will al-
~e J,:!'$Illain the fear that the opp,oaite OpitllJ)n may be t.ru.e be-
oause God is decel'rins us" Insl1ort. a deceiving God W'ouJA. d .... 
stroy the validity ot human knowledg •• 43 
lop this reason we find Descartes 8i ving a number ot rea .... 
sons vlAyGod is ElJtCllS-. from oausi:ng OUJ." errorlt.. .JH.~Bt of a.ll. 
hegl;.ves a. metaphysical argument showing that ileceit is repug-
nani; tic God. :Seaondl:r~ he excuses God for giving us 8. will and 
#. I , 
42~edi,la:~~ons ,LaIl'leur, pp. 47-48. 
43Ibid" p. 32. 
tu:lAarstanding that are not absolutely :perfect. And thirdly t he 
shows that the mll el;'t'$. not in so taX' as it comes frob' God t 
but in so far as it is miaused by US:. 
First ot a.ll. then. tOl:" the metapbysiealargument showing 
that God Ca.tlllOt deceive US'. rtFor first t I recpgnl.ze that it is 
impossible tor God ever to deceive m.e, sinae in all fraud an.d 
de~ption there ia some kiM of imperi:eet1on. 1uld although it 
seems that to be able to dee-ai Va i.8 a mark ot (acumen,)44 (sub-
tlt1i~.)45 or p4)~. neverthel~ss to wish to deceive tastifies 
withoui;question to we~$sor malice, which could not be tound. 
i:nGod. lf46 Much the eam. argument isoftered in the ~ngipia., 
JtTh~tirst ot (led· s Utributes Whiell talls to be, eorundered here 
1sthat ne is absolute13 true and the souroe 0:£ all light t so 
that it is evidently a Qontre.d.ietion that lie sh,Quld deeeive us. 
tha:i 18 to say that He should b'$ properly and posi tiv$ly the 
oaUM ot the errors to \It.deh we are consoious of being subject. 
For although the oapae1ty!or d~$it would seem to be a. mark at" 
subtlety ot mind amongst m.an, ;.ret thew111 'bodeceive p.rQceeda 
on.).y;t,rom malice .. or fear. or weaknEf.ss" and iV cannot eonse-
J '11] It .• f. i r t 
4+The word ftacu:min1sff is not found in the Frencb translation •. 
(Ot:. Med. IV, A. T •• VII f 5.3·.) 
45Th• 'from "subt11it-e't is not .found in the· original Latintt · (Ot·. I&. .. ll. A.1'~. IX. 43.) 
46~:~t"'t~qp!. IaF l$ur t p •. 48 41 
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quently be attributed to God._47 
But Descartes' absolute faith in G¢d seems to be at least 
weakened by the tact that; we have everythl1l3 from God., and that 
our 1'awlti.esdo aotually err. TMs b~ings us to his second ar-
gument. Since &rror is a privation 1 we might wonder why' God has 
not given our faeult1&$ all that is d.ue to tihem. God i.8 de-
f$'nde4 1.n this tnatter in two wa;ys. First ot" all, we simply can-
not understand why God does what he does.48 And this lack of an 
Ul3:d(tz.stanc11:ng of God's ways should not lessen our faith in Hirr,,_ 
SMondly. we $h()uldoonside~ the p"'l'eetion of creation as a 
Whol.. for what apllt'U$ to be an iL1pert.eid.on in an individual 
ele_~t dOe$ not appear m~rteet when. considered as a part or 
the Ylbole of clteat1on.'+9 
" •• hould not oomplain beeause God has not given us an 'tlll* 
d&ntand1ng that is unlinrl:te4 and a will that is u.nerrir..g. 
RatheiT' n. shau14 be'gfttiefUl for tho good things Rehasgranttttd 
us ~, not co~plainthat He does no~ bestow from His bounty all 
that we knew He might have diSP$I1S$d._50 He adds one turther 
al"~t: tf And a1 though God has n,ot given us an understanding 
whtcm 1s omnipotent, Vie must not £01' that reason consider that 
4?lia.ldane and RQss. p. 231 • 
. . 48..1D:!i12ai, !&Fleur. pp. 49-50. 
49 i}ii~f1., p. 50. 
50Ha.idane and" Ross, p.. 234. 
Reia th~ o.r1.ginatoro:t our errors. For all ereated.'t.lll'Uier-
standil:)g i.s finite, and it is of 'the nature of t:in1te~der­
stand:ing not to embraoe all things. ~51 
And t:1nally, ]}esca.t1ies argues that h~ is "a mean betw.en 
God .a.n.(l. noth11"lgn~Bs t that 1s, so pla¢ed bet\V~Uln the supreme 
Be1:pgand non.-being that, in sO .tar as a supreme Being hail pro-
duced me, there 1s truly nothing .in me which could lead. me into 
error; but if I consider myself as somehow par'b1el.'pati!l6 in 
notiliingness Ql' non-being, that ls, 11'160 far as :r am. net m;yseU' 
the supreme being (and am. lacking many thingS.) t 52 (I find myseU 
exposed to sa intin1 tyof detects, $0 that )53 I sllmild not' be 
ast'onished if I go wrong .• »54 
There are, of course, two W8;1s in whioh God could m.ake us 
ttnal>le to o~, and yet eJ.low us our .t~edom.. -He migllt, £.0'11' .$%-
NIlpl .•. t have @.i1 venmy understand:l~ a clear a.nd di$t1net eom.p~ 
Attnsion ot all the tl:.inge about whioh I should ever dellb$l!-
ate."';' BUt el&all'ly, God. bas not done thiS, nor did He haVe to 
do t t.,But bhere is another way He m.ight have helped ll16 so that 
51a l.51., p-. 23? .. 
52TheVlOrda Udesuntque mibi qU8.:1:plurima tl are not found in 
the Fnnch translation. (Ct.~. IV. A.T., VII, 54.) 
5~The words If is me 
mens, de f'a~on que" are 
Me4. lIt A.'f., IX. 43.) 
/ I / 
trcmue expose a une in.tinite de manque-
not fouv.d in theorlginal Latin. (ot. 
54f;ieCt:+'ifl;tion,st I.laFleur. pl 49. 
5'Ib:id. t p. 55. 
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r would be less s,l1sceptible to error. tor !the migllt simply have 
e:n.graved so deeply in rq memory thf;t resolution never to pass 
judgment on at'q'tt..1ng without conee! v1ng it clearly and distinotlJ 
that I could nsve.l' torget tUs rul~., 1156 Although. God Himsel!, ha.S 
not 1.mpres,sed this rule on my mem.o1'7. still this mtm1ler ot 
avoi,ding erro:r is within DO' grasp. I can, by reso~v1ng never to 
judge Without a clear and j1stinct 1a.ea, aequire the habit of :001 
errillg.57 For every clear and dietinct 1d,ea is someth,ing real 
.ana: positive, thus hav1.ng its origin from God, "and consequently 
W$ must conclude that such a conc.ption .. " .. is true. n58 fh,ero-
fore, it I ~u4ge only where the idea is perceived by my under-
stand1ng olear ly and distinetly,. 1. shall nev&l."' err. 59 
.And so, not only can we ...,. that God is not the Qa.u.se of 
()u:s.".r~mJ, but also that He has given us everything needed for 
a eonec'b LTJd true judgment. Theelaments !l(i)oeasary tor a true 
judgment are a ole:u' and distinct ld$:a, en understandi..'l'l.g that 
cl.early and distinotl:y pareei ves, and a will that treely arf1-l."m.IIJ 
or denies. And even, when we do not have a clear and distinct 
idea, the will is never forced to make a judgment.60 The willii 
56xb.1d. 
-57Ibid .• 
-58.Ib,~p..... p_ 56. 
59aa.ldane and £loss, pp. 231, 232. 
60MM1j;at!OnE!,t LaFleur, 1>;),. 51. 
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a.lways free to withhold its aSSfJn t. 61 
In conelusion. theret'ore, we find that Descart,e.s ha.s ex-
plained error by saying that it is caused by t1'U:1 vrlll in an act 
ot affirming or denying wha.t is net olearly perceived by the 
understa."1ding. Although God has given us these "CWO faculties, 
n 
which in eOn.juRtlon ea.u~e error, He is in no way e;u:tltr ot 
causin.g our errors t because in themselves these faculties can-
not~Qwrong, and becau3e error is not a real thing, w:t-deh would. 
mal~e it depe:n.dent on God, but a privation, which f!.lp...kes it depend .... 
ont QIlourselves alone,. It is only wlle:n we use our .faculties. in 
a V1a::! not L'1tended by the Creator that we fall into error • By 
t.b:us explai.'t!..i:ng the prox1r.uate cans'as and natur~ of errol.~ Des-
carte:$ has sat1a.tied himself that G()d is in no way the cau.sa o£ 
6lualdane and Hoss.. Pl'. 232 t 2}4 ~ 
CHAPTER III 
THE WILL, UNDmUJTAN.DIl~G, A?m JUDGMENT 
ACOORDING TO DESCARTES 
In the previous ohapter we exa.m.ined De.soal"tes· doctrine on 
error in genera.l and disoovered that error iSti detect caused by 
oUJ:$elve$~and not ~l'.J.ng Ha.ll caused by God.. It results 
from an 1nte,rpl.~ or the understanding and the will in judgment. 
But in what we have seen oJ: f,~~1ta!r10 Qu.arta and fl:!neip1a Phi-
19.1l$U?~ erm ?N!). Des(lart$$ 1s not al~s expllc1 t abcut 
theeuot nature of the Will, understanding, and judgment. He 
ha. WIled these concepts, but he does not always elCpla1n them, 
... pt in a V9r'Y' g$neral way. Therefore!t it will be necessary 
ttl) anaqze these no't10llS mo:re oarefully, taking the material tor 
o~enal~s1a .tromthe above ment1on:ed works as well as !rOm o~h .... 
er pUeage. in his wri t1ng, .. 
It will be neclessa~ to consider not only the two faculties 
, i J., I ~ 
J4 
ot _11 Ind Ullderetedillc. _t d_ the act ot Judg11l8fa1ne_ 
1;1':11. 1880 1ntiuteq .,llnHt$4 wl_ h;ls dootrlu oJ: ~or, 8Al 
tdl'l.oe .nor 18'1 .b14"~ 1n 1J:he $u4pat: a10ne:. Be4aua$ ;J~-' 
1a h ~ Wil.l. MOO~ toD •• ~ ••• 111 w1.1~ btr meN pt-of1t-
ab.le 1)0. 1J.iUll7M fiI"$'" tn. ull ~md _~h i:t 'the undel."'.1ulm41ng, 
8nd ~.n proc..a.to t.nJ%' di •• u8.en. of t11. ;jw.tpent. F~ OU' 
co'-derat'io. ~. th. wtl1 :cw4 u.o4.H'a.n41nc .. 1f111 be .a. ... 
••• ~ he p1.... j.Ud-.-t in the ·.11 aM )tet in the .'tile .. _ •• 
,0£' thot18ht ••• ~ ••• mU.ns. 
;A.pln.u in tn. ~.tw.Oha,'pt_ ... ahUlatt.:mpt, as ;tu 
M pou1:bl.e* ., __ an 1a ••. Nala of Dee •• t ... - t~pt, .. 
~ .... of 1. ftl,1.ti't7J1< ire .$'ball. ~.rt _sort to ~.~ 
~ .. , b tUa , ... :&i.'.h .... h_eve~ t:b.e,. oan sit_ _._ USh' 
on the •• ",. at ~. 
1$.. eh.u.-. t __ Wlll. .a l.Ude.t . .oUll.g a~~ the two 
s-_-l ... a tnthe OUl •• ta 4onr1neO'.t t~t. 2 50 ,.hapa 
1tM*.U "lHtt •• _41~ biB Mi,dOJ1 or thought and the· M.-
1Alatt.t tM ~41.'"not:tGa ~Oft .. dieeu.. the \flU ad 
......... 1,ng t;h ••• lv •• 
~ of all, then, wb .. :, 414 Dasoaft •• mean b7 "th(1)~h1r·? 
/ J._o.t41llg ",0 Jut.oombe an(\ aeac:n, the woRd imqlti i.n evexo;r4a:y 
:trench ot th. ~u_thcen~ .ha4 • w1der .,pliefltion than 
) u; 'p, 11._." 1141111 II. d I ...... 
nlode::cn Fre~ It was natural tl':l.:Em., though. not now, to re.fer to 
". 
an emotion as !m! MH.!e.. Likewise, the word. ?Ogi tw bad long 
been used by philosophioal La:tin in the wide sense. For example, 
!!S11at!Ct}l!i e9rpiwn 1n St. Thomas covered all internal states 
of' the m1.n4.' 
But the l!b:lgl:Lsh w'u.~ u'though1;ft has a plledoUdnan1tly intral-
leotual oonnotation. The1'efore. to tJ.'ansla.t$ !!S;!?UI an« i!aiU 
by the WON Bthought" would be ,1 'Ving Deseanes· doottrin. an :in-
teUectual oast that was not int$'l.ded by the author.4 How." .. ». 
nt;he words $l33 ms and tlh99.ih~ \\'1.11 sometimes dOl £01: e-ample. 1n 
the it!OiU1 ••• render "a au! iSa2 J.t. ~ by 1. s. !iM~ 
tl\llJ.l2D Iml~ b$caus. 1'.\.8. the _.,. involved, be-1ng an act 
of doubt1:tlfh .Nall7 is a thoUSht. ill the ol:d.ina.ry sense. W. have 
hOW ... .t'tQt't«:t found it alrlaa.ble to use more geneJ:'al term •• auch 
u'tl$ noun and veb 'mSlixS an.d the adJeot1v$ oon$01ous.,tt5 
B7 the tU'lll PlUS;!; tl~lC) Des4urteunderstan4s all t;hat we ue 
c,oQc1ous of as opera:1rins is us. ~er$fore t this wid. use of 
Q;oA'd.1tat10 o.r mYM will includ.e not only un4e.rstfW4:hag. willing. 
and ~nat1on, 'but also :.e •• ling and emotion.6 
There 1s no doubl1:ln Dellctl1"tes' :mind that he aet.lly has 
3Rene D.$Ca.rteatP~$o.,* W~~t.\ffh &de.. & trans. An-
scomb. and Geaoh (Edin15u., . t p. V !. 
~~i$. 
'ibid •• p. xlviii. 
Gpr1nf.l1'Pia:, A.T., VIJ.l j 7. 
.... 
thoughts, that he thinks, .ince thi8 :1.$ the firstindub1table 
conclusion which occurs to anyone philQsophizing in a.norde,rl;r 
manner.? ~ought is ths:e$senee o.tthe thinking seU or mnd, 
and we lm.ow 'the mind more clearly than anything elae. Fora 
substanoe is known more ale8J.."l,. in proportion to the number of 
quali'ties we Uscern in that $Ubstanc&. But all tho.. operations 
.of the mind. $ueh as unclerstanding, w1111ng. imagining, 1l'Ml1ng. 
eto_, are qualities 01 thought t though Descartes Use$ the ape-
Gille 'tferm "mode" tor the generio tex-Bt "quality." And since we 
.lalOwof more qu.e.llt1ea o.t the mind 'than of the body, the mind ia 
bett4l~ ~ than the bodY-irS 
Further on in the ~~!il » •• eartes is more explicit eon..,. 
C$rning the division of his oonscious e:itperlenc8, for he elas .... 
s1l1e. t'he m.od$$ o.t thought into two general classes, of whioh 
one is tl:te mode ot p&l" -oept1on (tUlderstanding) .fU1d the othel' 
the rAC:de of volition (Will). Sensang, imagining, and pexocutlving 
ar4l ditte-Z'ent modes of the und.btanding.. Des1.ring t bei,Ii.gawa.re. 
a!.fi.t'lrdng. de:n;ring. and doubting are different modes ot willing.9 
And this brings us to the discussion ot the mod$l tistino-
ti<>n.. Ao.o,orQ.1.ng to Descartest a substsnee is that wldch. is o£ 
it~lftlO 1thile an at'bribu1fe 1s that 'which 1s imperfectly di.a-
4 j)1 r f I , iI, .;Ii 
7I~4 •• P. 8. 
S Xb~. 
91:2:1.4.. p. 17. 
tinot from the substanoe, that is. we can tb1nk of one without 
thinking o£ theother. But a mode is that which is dlstinctfrom 
substance in such a VIIs::! that substanoe is perfectly distinct from. 
the mode. although the mode is only imperfectly distinct trom 
subst@ce. For example. one can think o£ $ubstanoe (corporeal) 
vdthout tbillking ot motion (mod~), although one eannot think of 
motion Without at. the aue tim. thin1d.ng of substano4h;ll Applying 
thi .•. modal distinction to the thinking substance., th.e mind.12 we 
find that we C.a:n think: of the mind without thinking or either the 
will or the Ulldtu.'eta.nding, but we cannot tlUnk of eitheX' the will 
or UJ:l4er$te.nd1:ng without thinld.ng of the mind. 1; 
Th1S111odal distinction 1a quite convenient tor D~.cartest 
s:Lll¢e it helpe h.im explain how the understanding and will, which 
Ut.' two quite (tiV'~r$e .faculties, can cooperate to pertomasln-
g~j_pent. Although we oan think of the understanding without 
t.bLZlld.n.g of the will t and viC$ versa. t we can thinko~. lle1 tIler 
without thinld.n.g of a eGmmon .lement, the miIld" 14A.tl.d sinoe what 
.lO.b1~.. p. 24. 
ll~.'i!' p,. 29. 
12itaubata.n.ti8., cui !nest immediate cogitatio, vocatur I~J.ep,$ .. ft 
Objectiones ~, A.T., VII, 161. 
13·~. . 29 
.W#ino.·, p. • 
. '. 14~ ~rJ4 for Descartes is a simple subetanoe,that is. a 
su,bjeet (substance) l.rl whioh we oomprehend only thougb.t (attri-
bute) with the various m.'Odes of thought (in general,the will 
and the und$%'stand1ng). Notae in E£2~t A .. T", VIII t 3,50-351. I ,_ 
.-. 
is clearly and distinetl;y thought, exists as it is thought, we 
O!:ln conclude tor Deseartes that the will and understanding, be-
cause the:r are thought of as en sting together, aotually do ex-
ist together. Thererore~ it would seem that fox' Desca.rtes these 
two taculties,one ot which is superior in both :-ansa and dig .... 
nity to the other, 15 oan work together quite easily. Thiswa 
propose as one possible help for DesctU"'tes sinoe be d.oes not ar-
e;u,G in this ntruu'le:r it. As a matter of fact t he does not seem to 
giva any effective answer to the question of how the will and 
understanding \fOrk together.16 
Now that ive have sean the general analysi til of the mind 1nt(J 
its a.ttribute (thought) and modes, let us. first or all, con-
s1d,rthe mode of thought c.all.e4 the will. We shall eonsider 
thcl existenoe of the will; and its na t't.U:'e : as a power of a.f-
t'1.rm1ng and denying, tiS a perfeot power. and as an unlimited 
poweXOll 
D~soe.rtes does no'b spend much time proving tbat we aotuall.y 
hay. a will and the. tit is free. 17 In the :P;t'inciRi,a he tells us 
ftthat we possess a Free-Will which eauses us to abstain from 
gi vitt8 a,.sent to du.bious things, and thus prevents our tailing 
I' "._ j I! 
15~!4 .. lIt A.IJ:I., VII'f 56-'7. 
16N•K• Smith, li'ew S~die~ 2:.!! !!:! JfhilosOlZ& 2! Descartes 
(London." 1952). P. -m. . 
l7lt is to be noted that Desoartes melees no diat1.nction b .... 




into error. tllS HEt does not prove this assertion, but, rather, 
assumes that it is a self-evident truth. ItFinally, it is so &vi-
~ent that wa are possessed ot a free will that can give at' w1:th-
hold its assent. that this may be oounted as one of the first and 
most ordinary notio:l:ls tha:t are found innately in us. ,,19 The 
argum.ent he o£:ters for this sta.tement is that when~ in his pro-
cess. of methodioal doubt, he eVen 8uppoa;ed that God weJ.". de-
t;;uuv:Lng him. still he had the liberty to abate.in from beli.ev1ng 
lWh!l1r was notcleuan4 M8t1nct .. 20 
We see above that wilen nesoe..rte. is assertixlg the exi.&tenc8 
of l1lle will, he is alsl) deiinilne; its natur. as a. pow.er of 11£-
.fir.minS' and (i6D.:yi.ng. In filM:i:trat~o iuvta he states that the will 
nc.Qllsists only in the .fact that \VeGan .... a.!'fil't1l oX" deny, pur-
~u., 0;;0 avoid.. Or more pX'oparly, our free will consiats only in 
rt.h~ tact that ill a.t:t'irmil1g or denyillg. pursuing or avo;idingthe 
rthing$ $uggest,f!.Id by the undel?Standing, we behave in such a ws::r 
rtn,at we do not feel that; a.ny external torae has Q01l$i;rained us 
fi.n our d.,dSion.n21 
Thus the faculty of willing consi eta in the power ot af-
~i$ing or denying what is presented by the UlldElrstanUng, witb.-
181ialdane an,l l{oas t p. 221. 
19.0&&_, p. 234. 
2°f.r~~, A .. T., VIII, 19-20. 
21fldibtat.2.?lfiii t LaFleur., p. 51. 
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out a.n:r external compulsion. But to be tree does not m.ea.n that 
'Tie $.l.'s necessarily indifferent, £0:£' the m.ore 'fie are inclined to 
one of two eont:t:'8.ries. the freer W'e are. Tl1is inclination may 
COIr~e (I.-om the faot that one o.f the two contraries contuns more 
. 22 goodness.. or because (tod is guidJ. ng m:y min4... .t And certainly f 
divine gra(Hl and natur,a.l understa.ndil%" far from diminishing 1Jf3 
lib.ert~r, rather augment and atrengthGl'l it. iJioreovert t.bat in-
tti.tterence wl'J.eh I teel when lam not more moved toward one side 
thtal. thb other by (the w$ight or )23 SOllle reason 1s th$lowest 
degree Gt Uberty, and is rather a detect i.n the unt1ersta.lldi:ng 
tha,n a IHarfeetion ot the will. 11'or it' r always understood 
olearly what is true and what is good, I would never need to de-
lib~a:te about What judg.ment and what choice I ought 'co make .. 
and $C 1 would be e:o.tirtl;,y f:r:.e wi thou t ever being ind1t.f' e.~­
en:t:. tt24 
Alld since indltt&r$nQe is not a perfection. of the will, it 
is ~t ilu'd to 8" wbjr Desoartes would Glum that indi£teren(.H', 
iB uot &ssent1al to h't.'UJl&n lib-$lt'ty. If lAl nd tinally indi.ffere:nee 
does not belong to the tlSS$I.lC\l of human liberty, since we are 
fN$ not only when out' iguol'anoe ot the right rerlders us :Lndif-
!erent. but alao, and Chiefly, \vhen a olear pereeption impels us 
• ". 'I 
22~b14.t POll 52. 
4 
23:'.1:h$ p~a.s$ ttle poids d. til is not found in th$ original La~ 
in. (Ct. Had. !y~ A.T~, IX, 46.) 
2i~ita:tiQn~h LaFleur, p. 52 .. 
.... 
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to proseoute aome de£ini1;$ OourBS ••• 25 
This is Descartes' general (ioetr1neo! the nature of l1bert7 
0:£ the will as proposed in the :Mlditatioa_!. But on the matter 
of liberty of inditfe:t-.nee there so_a to be a change 1n doctrine 
in .bis later wox-b. In a le'cter to Father Llealand, 1\\87 2* 1644, 
he states that tf1 would have you ah&erve that I did IlQt say that 
a man ie indifferent only where he lacks knowledge" bu1; rather 
,hat he is m.ore indifferent in propon1on as he knows fewer rea-
aons tor choosing one side mt:ller than the other; ana this, I 
tll:tllk. nobody can deny. ,taG H.~e he seems to be admitting SOla$ 
kind of l1b~ of ind11't_.renee. 
W. need not go into the lnooted problem of why Desoartes 
~e4 b.1s doetrine on tn. will, or more speeif1caUy. on .tre .... 
dom of in41,tterence. Aeeording to Keeler: t'G11son' $ theais. that 
De.eal'te. had. no Qr:tg1naland. well worked-aut theory ~gllrdin.g 
human tretdom, has ~n generally accepted b7 hi.$tor1&lUh J42? 
Keel.er then concludes, spesld.ng tor himself: nInth. Meg1 i1a$::1oy 
he. speaks as a Tll.omiat, wherea.s in the J?e:1ne~:.El!~, a book written 
25R.n.D.$cert~,at T~ PA1toso~C;i.~ .~ D!~el' 
trans. Haldane and. Ross amSr (lg'Eh (} )-;-Ir; '249. 
26Anseombe and Geach, p .• 289. It is significant to note tha 
this l$tter was writ'ten in j,l.q 1) 1644, two months before the publj. 
ca.tion ot the .E;mN1R~!' and almost three years atter the publi-
cation 01 the MId ~:2.1.011!S. The sentiment expressed in this let-
ter seems to be tEe same notion of freedom of indifference as 
that haUl in th. Paat~a~. (Ct. 1?~ •• A.T •• VIII, 17-24.) 
" 21X .. lert pp. 165-l66.... lie 18 referri:t'l6 to Gilson, ¥l M.,1l9J:-
te . z De t.. $ 1 010 iEt Pa.t"1s 191 co. iii-vir.-
4.2 
a..ft. the outbreak of the JQ.rl$enist oont'rovers;r t and which 'the 
authQr hoped to see inl.lrodue.ed into the J esui t oolleges, the tone 
is rather that of a. Mollnist t tor whom indit:terenee· is insepara.-
bl$ from freedom. H28 But since a solution to this problem is not' 
essential to our thesis. let us leave the matter in the hands of 
thehisiior1.ana. 
Getting baok, than. to our discussion of the natureot the 
rill, let 1.\S prooe&don. step furthtr. \Va find 'that the will, 
the. tEr.C.ulty Of affirming or denying,' is not the will that is in a 
PUN mind. but is rather thenll or a thinking sel1' that is em-
bodied. 29 Therefore. it is intluel'.LCed not only by certain .natu-
ral. imp.luses; but also b,.. talse prejudiced aequiX'ed in early 
yea.n._ ThU$ we see how the remote souroes of error t _as. ted of 
in tile p"vioua chapter, tind the1.l" applieation here a.s at£ecting 
the proximate Gause ot el."':t'Ol:', the. will. 
It is alaothe nature of the will, a.ocording to Desoartes, 
to be pe,rfect and unlimited. And us. matter of fact, it is per-
lectin its freedom precisely because it is unlimited, that 1s, 
withbut limit's whioh restriot it. 30 It is perfect, and. indeed. 
the onl;rpe1'fect faculty we have; for not.h1ng ela. i.n us is so 
perfect or SO great that we cannot understand the poss1'bil.1ty ot 
28 ·i.ee~&r. p. 166. 
29N•K• Smith, ~ew?~!St pp., 78, 229. 
3OMd1t!ttiOnJ!h LaFleur, p. 51_ 
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something still more perfeet, still greater.,l The perfection 
ot the understand1:ng, as we shall see, is very-slight and greatl:y 
restricted; memol.7' t imagination, and all other raoul ties are al-
so possessed ofa reduced and oireumscr.1bed perfeation.;2 Of 
all the faculties in us. except the will. _ can toa the idea 
ot a far greater faculty. tt~h$r. is only volition aloa •• (or 
the liberty of the will, )3' which I experience to be ·so great in 
myself that Ioannot ooncai va the idea of any otheX" .0" (ample 
and)~ e~ten4ed.fl35 
And the 1"$&$on why the will 1$ perfeoti. that it is un-
l.1Jd.ted, that is, th$re ue no l1m1ts to its scope.. There 1$ 1\0 
assignable l1m.1t to the re.g. ot possible af£ir.m.atioDS and de.-
n1a.l., that is t 1n ~ap.ct. to .any propo'Si t10n we can contemplate t 
tm.. w.ill e·G a.f'tiril or 4e~. In pRat1ee, pe;r-haps. W& 1ntend to 
af't1l:m Only wbat we bel1eve to be tnUlt and to derq only what we 
belteve "tso lJ$ tala.. But ... also know tl:l.&.t WI' often ~f1l!'ll'l .and 
de~ propos1t:iOll.$i althOugh it is not our wont to affirm and. de-
n:rtb$n capriciously.. 811ill. ;1. t 1,8 wi -bb.in our power 'to do so.36 
3l.;t!~9-. 
;2DJ4 .• 
;;~ worda naive ubltrii liberty*'. ue not t~ in the 
:French translation. (Of it !Sf ;IV I A. IJ}. t VII. 57.) 
J4.fhe words It ample €en are not .found in the Latin original. 
(Cflt~.' n. A.T •• IX, 45.,) 
?'~"'tat1()!Yh LaFl$UX",. p. 51. 
36w-aa 1 ( Y\,.... n'!'li.· 1 'ih.-ll;? 
In su..mma.ry, th$ll, C~ analpi.tJ of the will consists in this. 
thAt man has a. free will, whose !uncu1on it is to affirm and de-
ny what .1.8 apprehended by the understanding. And. this tree wi.ll 
or pow.rot choioe l.s both perfect and unlimited. 
S$Oond.lyt befol:& goi.ng on to see wh;y neeoaJrtes 1$ forced to 
' .. ju4.pent an aet of the will and not of the ~ • .l'stand1ng, 
le~ uaconsidar the understanding in itself'. In our. &n~sis ot 
t~tWd$r$t"'ding W$ ahall. d1$~U$$ .ita nature as being pass.ivG. 
as being imperfect because 11lJd ted, and yet in some Yl«:fper£ ect. 
ahall aee that th1a faoulty hass~me p3!'imacy ovax' tbe 
. .'.fhe un4.,l'$~an41ng 1n l.alDwizlg ~8t. as it were, "pat.iently- con-
~pla:b~Ve.:n'? A. a matte" of .taot, nit ¢annOt invMtf'or 1t-
seU ... ,lingle nn idea; and be1.ng thus passive in the reoeption 
! ~08. 'Which present 'thenu!lelves to it. neither can 1 __ in any 
~ mod1t7 or distort tha. M' ~ Tw. reason the und$~"a.nd1ng 
~tmod1t7 nOJ: distort thnse ideas. wh1.oh oome to it 3.$ tllat 
~~'. ,ieation and di.stortion are actioD$ and the unde:rsta:n41ng is 
~ with th1e emphasis on the :pae$iv1ty ot the undevatM.d-
.we lIligll.t wel.l ask ourselves the question: Just W'ba.t doe$ the 
~ .... ,ratan<.11ng 40? It. is a tacul ty, and, therefore, .,. would ex-
37N .. X• Snd:th1 1h 228. 
3SIl?~'. 
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paot it to do something. Di!sca.rtea answers our inquiry' in M!9:i-
~sAA2Sma1i'hen h. says that: ftthe m1:04,in oonce1vinfh turns 
som~how toward itself and considers some one of the ideas which 
1~p08$e.aes in itself ... ;9 
'Although the understa:nding can £:veely think or not t1U.nk 
1deas,onc's they are thought they eont1'01 and goven the m1nd .. 40 
1~ reason :tor this passiVity is because, as Descart.$ ~.. "I 
do not d.:1st1ngu1sh Qthenis. be'tM"een m1nd end its ideas than be-
men til pieoe ot: wax and the 41ft.rent figure. that it Otitn re-
e.1ve1 ancl as it 1s not properly an &C'tion. but a pa$8ion in the 
wax·'~ rH;eive different f1.~t it seems to me that it is alao 
a passion :l.n the mind to reo.iv. suoh and such an idea, and th$.t 
OXl.l7 ita nlit-lone are· aot1ons. n4~ 1'0%", as he vells us in M!!!1-
SIH' ·Q\\1.n!~t "thus, to.t' example ,when I imagine a triangle- .. 
even '.' t~, there may pema:pe be no such .figure anywhere in the 
wo~14 outside of my t.hought, nor ever have been, nevertheless 
the tlgu.re eannot help haVing a. eertain d6'terminate nature, or 
.foX"Illor essence. wh1.eh is SJrunutable and .ternal, wl'..1eh I ha-.. 
"9f4.ia.t~ons. LaFlwr, p. 6;" To put this desor!ptlon of 
th .. a.Qt'r~lii un'(!8x-stand1ng into context, Des,cU'tes is here 
c.parlng it to the act ot imagina.tion, which use convertat ad 
eorput at &liquid in eo 1dMe vel a. se il1telleetae vel sensu 
peN$pt.ae conforme 1ntuee.:f;ur., It !t!- It., A .. T., VIr. 7'3. 
40Normnn Sndth. atu.di~! ~n thl Cut!,aiap. I'b.1l.QSRRel (Lon-
don. 19(2) ,p~- 109. ' 
41~:n14 •• p. lOOt footnote. (Ot. ~tt.'t AlT., U. 199.) 
J 
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not invented and which doea not in a:t1y:.wa:y depend upon my m1:nd .. J4-2 
Of oourse, to Ett'plain the fact 'that ideas oontrol and govern the 
mind \ Deseart.a must resort" 'to innate ideas. <4·3 :i;'hase innate 
ideas ueimplanted in the mind by God, a:nd t there! ore. the mind 
does niirii haw to torm tha, but simply has to become conscious 
otthem .441-
l3esi.d.$sbeing pass! w t the u.nderstanding 1s upertect t be-
cause its range 1$ very liJlli ted. The things the understanding 
ean know olearly are lewer by tar than the things the will can 
a.tt!1'm ol,'ld.de~. 45 Althought;tbe W'Jde"tanding can. con:bfmlplate 
ideas olearly .and distinctly, and, therefore. adequately. it con. 
template. others. mOM or le.s clearly. But as we pointed out in 
t:retttlngct the remota $cnu-c·&. of error, ma:o.y men }now only 0011-
!u$$1 17 "due to the """08.· ot 7outh, the inabilltar to forget 
tnfUJt· jrEljudioes, th$ e&$il$' tir1n8 nature ot the undere tand1 ng" 
d 'the it1&dequate use of wo_.~ Though Vie desire (_11) to 
undetstand el&arly what WEJpec~d.V1t obecu.rel:;r.f we otten tail to 
do .f>. And al:tihough the 1111.1 can affirm or de~ ~:pos d.it1ons 
'" "I: I. 
4~1t1al8bli"anChe obj&ots to tbJ.s pos'1tion on two oounts: first 
it would involve an infinite number of ideas i.n a !ir.t1te mind; 
'and $8cotl41y. even it the mind had stored up in i tseJ..f all these 
14 •• , it would be impossible to explu.n how it could find those 
!tt1llan.·.:tedlt N. Smith, p_ 1091 footnote. (He is referring to 
Malflbntnehe t Rasa!~he. p 1\ ;.,0 tf.) 
~oad. slIlith. P. 109. 
4~ia.t AlT. VIII. lB. (lor the dispute betw. een Des-
cartes ... aseendi on the 1n.fini tude of the will as opposed to 
the limited understanding, ct. Keeler., pp .• 168-169.) 
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capri.c1ouslYt as it were, it 1~ot oapable o~ causing .'"er:1 
proposition to be clear. Henee. to say that the intellect is 
limi ted and the will unl1m1 ted without qualification, would be 
misleading. Perhaps it would be closer to Desean&s' real 
mean:i ng to $8J" 'that the un4$~standl.ng I, power for clear and di ..... 
tinct ideas is very lim! tGd. alt;hough its povl&r :for knowing, at 
least ObsC1l.rely. is much 1$$8 limited. 
Al:though the understanding is i.mpfIrfect because it is 
Umtte4.it 1$ in I!lloiihar senae no less per:fect tMnthe will. 
Eee11112; tells 'US~ Jt~.tth$\" are JJU.n)'" thillf$8 " cannot under-
I$ten¢.yet \'I11a:a we do u.tlde.rstand olearl~ U. exactly as we p$r-
o_vl 1 t. ThC'llgh the limitations Of our understanding are me,ny t 
in nO' lns'tlulCe 1. underste.nd1ne; tdsceptive* or positively mis-
leadj.ns in 1ts d.1"1.8U.~8.·46 In other WOMS, theunde·rstandin 
ot'~_U cannot lI'lfI.ke mistH •• 47 This 1s true tor three rea-
s()'cs. First of all t th& 'U.nd.e.ratanding is men.1y passive and. N-
o.pt1 vet %lot havi.t.lg the po_~ 'to falsify id.eas. ae$Ondl~, 4.1l 
clfJUt and dist1.nct ideas ~e ot their ver:r nature 1:irae; and so t 
wh~ev$r the understanding reoei V$$ a Q,letU" and distinct idea t 
it!._ incapable of .nw.king e. mj.stakEh An4 thirdly, a.s we shall 
soe, th.re is no $rror ~rm8take in .judgment uni#il the will 
GO$$'Sintc> play. Oonf'Usad ideas, -as we shall also see, can b$ 
r t l' 11 't 
46~ll~tP .• 157. 
41!!l_ n. j.",T., VII. 56~ 
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calledmatertally false, but these is no formal falsity until 
the ;judgmEmt affirms or d.nies~ But no ma'tter how clear or ob-
scure the ideas, as long 'as the understanding is content simply 
4-8 to contemplate these ideas, there is no danger of error. That 
iete 8a7, merely knOwillg 1d.eu will-n.ever involve formal £a1s1-
"t7. 
Even though, in thct 6X'dinal.'7 sense ot Cartesian e'Pist~-· 
mo 10 [(Y , 1;he Understanding 113 imperfeot t and the vl111 perfect, 
stiU the Wlderatand:i.ng has a certain prirraoy over the will. 1,0-
~ord1ngto Deeeartes mtm f $ will is most perfedt and most free 
when it ju.d.g$. on tt olear and distinot idea. '·For if I al~$ 
cle@l:y understood. what is true and What is good, I wouldnevel' 
n~ to deliberate about what· judgmfmt and. what choice I ought 
toma .. , and 80 I \vould be entirely tree \fithout ever being 1n-
dilfuent. tt49 This doetr1rie 1s expressed by N.K. Smith in the 
t:ollO'W1ng manner: "In man the intellect bas primacy o:v$:r the 
will,).. it 1.s onl,.in proportion as the!} true and the good are pre-
ftr.d.ently tJ.pprehe-nded that the human will can aohieve freedom of 
act1oJl. ,150 On the other hand. we can misuse our freedom by 
judging on what 1s not clear~ enouf!)l ullderstood. But whetl1ar 
the will judges correotly 01'" not t the ideas must .first be per-
r I I 
~$ling, Pit 158. (Ct. P£ine., .A.T •• VIII, 9.) 
49~!S1;tfa~on" LaFleur, p. 52. 
501f•K• Bm1th. p. 268. 
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oeiV$d ;51 and in this Bense the' understanding has pr1maey over 
the will .• 
Thus we see that the understanding 18 passive, iP.lpe~f'ect, 
and llmited; while the will is active, Jler.teet t and unllmit$d.. 
Ma.haf,ty compares the two faculties: ItOur understanding is !i-
ni te .. ,,. • Ou.:t- will is rash. II 52 
Flnall:y let us turn our atteuti.on to the ju.dgment. :For 
'V8.rioua reaaons i).$cartee claiIils that judgment is in the will., 
K.e~.J:' enu.me:ratEul four of these reasons :53 First of all, the 
undentandiD6 is a pu:t'$l;r passive taeult7 whose only dut::r it 1$ 
to re:ceive ideu. Therefore, all the act1vitiss of the soul be-
long to the will., 54 end not to the' understanding. For th1$ rea-
son (judputnt. whioh is obnousq an action, belonss to the will. 
s.o.~. ju.d.pent ia ottenb.&. Which implies the operation of 
a ~l'aoulty. th$ wi-U. fh.adly. jutigment Dl:a;r be fale., 
Wh-.- .here is no talsity in the uooerstanting.56 An4 finally, 
.~ on the assumption that the will ;judges can one recono.11e 
&non with the divi.J::le. verQoi~.,57 For it the unde:rs1ian41ng t 
51fD-nS •• A.T. VIII, 18. 
52,J,p. Mahaffy, Des2Ht •• (London,. 1901), p. 170. 
53Keeler. p. 163. 
54Letter to P. Mesland .. A",T., Iil, 113. 
55Keeler, p_ 16;, 
56!t4- JX, A. T • ., VII ~ 56. 
57 Keeler t P_ 16~. 
wbich is passive, were to ~udg. flftOneOl1sl;r, the eau.$. of error 
cQuldnot be ill itsell t since ii? is ,passive. Tbere£o~. the 
oause 01" the error would be something ~.~ to the under-
standing, eith$:r God or, the will. Descarte. rules out the ti,rst 
posaib1.1it-y 1mrn.u.a.teJly. The a.ooM po,ssibill1;y. namely, t:b..at 
the will causes the intellect to e1'l:', canllot be gre.nte4 by Des-
cartes e.ither. "1£ the intellect be 'conceived on the analogy O£' 
a :piece at '\flU. t1:.tat pUs1vely receives irup.-essious. Or Ofa 
m1n»r that re:fle-ets more or 1&$$ di$t1nctly such ideas a.s come 
betore it. then it is 1nee.pa.b,le Qf torming a synthesis o~ ideas, 
lEtt al.one prOnouncing it ilo be true or talse t a:ud 1 teould not. 
consequently, exere!se .UGh powe~ at 1ihe behest of the will. I 
cQ\l.ldHe links betwe.$ll. ideas, but not ,comm:n&,t .!l 5!1yid,Sp,. 
'.,llBtJiWji&!m-. posit some.tning as exi.sting in thillg'e • .,58 
And 80,. if th$ utlders1.7.anding ean malte an erroneous ;judpent 
na1th.r beo.au~}e of itsel.t nor becal1se 'Or sor,}etlU.ng els6, we can 
only-oonclude that the undeX'standil'lg does not judge. 
~heref ore, Descartes t theol:'7 of the human mincl inevitable 
l~ him t~ the oonolusion 1J:hat the wi.ll judges. But although 
it is 'bhe will that judges t wed..o not imp17 that the uud.er ... 
stend1ng plays no part. For the will must t obViously ~ l'lave 
a~thing to ~udg. a.bo1.1t*'9 ~ judgment. therefore, consists 
58I1!1d. (01'. !a., lIt A.T. VII, 57.) 
5~H •• A.T., VIII, 18. 
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in an interplay between the understandi ng and the will t the 18. t-
tel" faculty actuallydo1ng the af.f'irmill8a.nd denying.. The under--
standing furnishes the ideas, which are merely subjeotive ap-
pearances 1.n the mind. Betore these a.ppearance.s can bGCome know-
ledge the will must intervene and interpose that objeotive real-
1. ty which the ideas ot themaelves do not possess., In brief.. the 
undeotanding alone coneeives; the vvil~ aloue af.fima or denies .. 
T.h,e judgment is different from the underst-and1ng. which 
gives immediate awareness. and this d1t1erenoe 1>& due to the 
presence in judgment Q! an .w9~d aJA121iW; 460 and this I!ig~ 
!iiliJ.!! is p:reeisely an attirmation or denial. liowever, we must 
not suppose that .this ju4gm.ent presupposes complete cognition. 
Descartes tells USl ttlfor. in order to lOX1ll &n:3 judgment whatever. 
is 11; neceasar:r that we should have a pex'feet and entire lmow-
ledge Qf a thins; for we Q;ften give our assent to things of 
which we have never had any but a ver,y obscure and contused 
knowledge .. ,,61 
rehus we see that both the will, which 1s infinite, un11mit~ 
and perfect, and\the unde~standing, which is limited, passive, and 
reoepb1ve, pl9J'" their part in judgment. Although the idea per-
oe1ved by the understanding is a neeessary component of'judg-
ment. atill, judgment is primarily an act Q£ the will, which 
Ji d I. tI • J ,n HI ~ 
~. ~ts~t A"T .. , VII, '7. 
6~ac", A.T •• VIII, 18. 
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affirms a.:n4 denies. 
It is to be noted that Descartes bas substituted a doctrine 
of jude;meIlt with the emphasi.s on the role of the will in at-
f~ng or denying. tor a patiently reoeptive and sheerly intel-
leotuaJ.:1st type of intuition as proposed in th.~le. 62 The 
rea..on for this al.:l.a.Dge seems to 'be the t8.Ot that V •• 4artes would 
be able to tinA llO solution for the p.roblera of erro~1nan int$l ... 
l$ctual intuition and still exonerate God. N.K .. Sm.itll oftftl"s 
SllOth.r reason tor this substitution., In 1628 Descartes came in 
contact 'With theParls Oor~egation of the Ofttory. 11 As the 
~l()sQPbW favored by tl:le Oratory was 1ll0H A.ugustin.i~ than '!'hom .... 
1st, .e oan e.onjec:ture wi tlt oonside.1"tI1ble probabi11 ty that this 
WS;S. an influence Wi..oh plqed a not unimportant put in fam11i-
art.d.ng De:sGartes with Au.gu.st1:tl1an teaching and thertb71n the 
la:t. shaping ot his own utap~sics. t,6, 
, J _ @ I .. il! t. hl4 
62In various places we find Descartes speaking of his intel ... 
lectual intuition: . ' III, VIII.U, In ~ XII. he 
stat$$; It Ad reru."I'1 co . '. Ol1$m dUO tantum SP&ct '. sunt, nos 
se1l1cet 1fU.1 cognoscimu.s. &. %'as 1p$ae cognoseendaEh I.n nobis 
quatuor sunt facultates tantum. quibus ad hoe uti possimus: 
ne:mpe intellectus, ime.ginat10, sensus, 3: memoria. Solus intel-
leetus equidem percipiendae veritatis est capax .. " Rewae a.d 
D1rI4Mi;~ t.OOn1,.i. A. T... X, 4&1. . ... -
6; 
.N .. K. Smith. p. a~. 
011Al?TER IV 
mE ROLE O:F TILE WILL IN ERHOR 
In the second chapter we presented Descartes t dootrine of 
error in a general way It In the third chapter we ~zed the 
three .fundamental notions neces.sary tor a complete understanding 
o£ error. namely. the will, understanding, and judg1l1ent. In this 
latter ·Ohapter we presc1nded, to a oertain extent. trom the 
questi,on or error, in order to discuss the nature of these three 
notions in themselves. Now we once again return speelf'1eally to 
the p:roblelu of error in order to investigate and present Des-
oartes' position mi)re tull;r. Again,6lS in the previou;s chapters. 
cl"1td.,ci$1Il will 'be omitted. And agal.ll.. a.s in the trJ..lX'i ohapter. 
we shall make use of various oommentaries which are aVllU.lable on 
De~artes' llotion of the nIl in error whallevfltr they Q$.n' help us ... 
. But before we dan s1 ve Descartes' complete solution to ex-
ro:c. 1t will first be necessar;y to discuss briefly two other 
points! What is truth, aeeoming to Desoartes? And. where is 
$rto~ not found? 
Truth, aCcOording to Descartes. is "e. sub.jectiv&$ertitude, 
-:uhatis true which I cannot h,elp believing. ttl True knowled.ge 
..... 
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is assent to what is certain, an*ts truth coincides with its 
carti tude * When I know something with full carti tude t so that I 
can neither doubt nor suepect reasons tor doubting, that know-
ledge is. trttefor me. 2 
We saw in the introduction that olear and distinot ideas 
are tbAl eri tarion tor truth. It we have a. clear and distinct 
idea of something, that thing is true.3 It 1. obvious.. then, 
fOl: Descartes to conelude: "For the lo.lolfledge u.pon 'flhic.h a car-
tun and incontrovertible ".udgment o,an b. temed, should not 
alone be oleaI,' but also d1stin.ct ... 4 Be states the sam~ idea in 
the t'1.nt rule of logic, whiCh is contained in 'the Disqours. 
"The .first rule was ., * .to include nothill6 in JII3' conclus1or...s 
'U.1lles$ 1it presented 1tseJ..f $0 clearly and dis:tinctly to my mind 
that 1 had no occUion to 40ubt 1. t 111 n 5 . By this he J\eEmS that we 
m.uat· tlaretully avoid .e.n;s bute or prejudice, and accept as true 
only 'Wh.at can be verUled, by on."' .• qwn 6xp6ri.enoe.. Ti'u.th,., 
th~e!ore. is a subjeotiv. certitude ot someth1.ng based on a 
olear and distinct idea" 
The second question we wiah. to aD.$W&:t" is: Where is error 
not found:' n.sc.artes taltes tor gl.:'ante.d that tals1tyin things 
.f 
2!S. y,. A .. :.1:., VII) 25. 
;t:!d. ~;rI. A.T •• VII, 35. 
4aa.J..dane and Ross t p. 237. 
SRene Descartes, D~efOY£S! .s l\;11tth~. trans. LaFleur (New 
York,. 1(50), p. 12. 
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is absurd. G What t then, of the possib111 ty of error in the im-
agination or senses? llna.ges, talten as psychic events are true. 7 
The senses, sinoe they do not 1:aunediately perceive things out-
side, must be true. Error will come in only when judgment is 
involved, by which we mistakenly suppose that these p,&rceptions 
are likenesses or things outs1de. 8 
Neither can ideas, in themselves, be talse aocording to 
Descartes in _wl;,;;.,ed_1_t_a_t_~_o Te~tia t ftNow as far as ideas are eon-
earned, it we oonsider them only in themselves and do not relate 
them to something else, the,- oannot, properly speaking, be 
talse. tt9 Oue reason tor this impossibility of error is that an 
id~a is just what 1 t is and nothing more. But ideas must be 
true for still another reason. An idea is true in the sense 
that what it represents muat have real being. Wftt'e this not the 
ease, God would deceive us by oreating id$l!ls that represented 
1.llll"e:a.l things. But here we must :make an important dist;inetion. 
When we say that an i.deel in 1 'be.lf' is true t we are speaking ot 
cleU and distinct ideas. Descartes bases the veracity of a 
oleu and distinot 1d.,a, on the principle that God exists t and 
that .'Ie:t7thing we ha.ve comes from Him, ever;ything, that is I) 




9Me~~tat1ons, LaFleur. p. 33. 
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that has positive real1t7, But aoonf'tl8ed andobscu:re idea is 
not positive.inca it put1cipates in notr...ingness, that is. it i 
not wholly per.tect. lO And $0, as w. shall see, these ideas (eo 
tUtted )dO not contain formal eln"Or, although they do contain 
ma1ierial erx.-or. 
As long 8.$ an idea. is just an idea. EtXisting in the mind. 
there can be n.o error-. fJ:he reason Descartes gives for this 
statement 1s that "tf r oonsidered the ideas only as certr.dn 
m.odes (Ol:*l!lspects)ll of m:/ thought, without 1ntend1ng them to 
rtlter to some oth.J" eD.riol" ob3eet, they could hudJ.y offer me 
a <>lUlnce of meld.Ilg a mistake. ,,12 
. t.fh1s last quo_tion gives us a clue to a further diatinatio 
De.cutes ma.kt:as about' eftc-%'1 namely, between an 1dM being ma-
t_la11,. or .formally false. a. spoke above of giving the _te .... 
nal lOf! error, and so it is only natural for h1m to. make the 
dini.nc1iion between f'ormal and. aterial error. A el.ear andtia-
tin~t 1d.& is not formally :tala .• " sinee formal ·~o·r is had only 
in judgment.· Nor is suoh an 1d .. even material.ly .talse, 8.1noe 
a. eleu anddl..st1.ne'b: idea is of 1 ta very na:ture true t sinee it 
comes trom. God, and is the or1tel."ion of t:t'U.th. But Goni"uaed 
f if t ) 
l0!!ll_ ~t A.T., VII, ~39. 
~e 'WOrds nOll ta,ons" are not .found in the original Latin. (ct. !mil> !U" A,T.tIX:. 29.) 
12H!SiA;if!;iiioy, J .. aFleu.t>, p.. 33. 
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ideas can have material talsi ty t l} although they canno1; have 
formal falsi fly $1;Qce formal error is had only in the judgmen:b. 
Such ideas are oalled materially false beo.s,use th$Y can offal." to 
the wi~l the ma'terial for an erroneous asliJent~ ,So we conclude 
that, the only ;falsity ideas can have is tlle material .+al.sity of 
conluaed ideas. But si:l.lJl.e material i'alai ty is not real. ex'l'or, 
we ce.n say that ideas int:tlomselves are not talse. 
Perhaps a. .t'l.lrther clarificatio.n of wilat DesOra..rtes me-ans by 
a.o.nfu.aed ideM would be praf'i.table bere. Byeonfusedideas h.e 
us'Q;ally means ideas of tio-called secondary quali. ties. For ex ... 
@:ple,color,. heat, Qold, or pa.in. 1'he oordusion in such idea.s 
oomeafrom the l:aot t.hat we canaei va them as existing outside 
the nlin:1 in bodies. when the tacto! tb$ matter is t:r~t they 
repre$ent nothing existing; outs1de the min4,14 ~ese ideas in 
themselves are so obsoure that they do not reveal their sub-
ject1,vity,and, theretQre ... tend to mistake them :for ~epre­
a.entati ves ot existing things.15 But 111 ~11 W t they repl'e-
sent what is nothiIlg as 1;f 1.t were something.16 And thu.s ma-
terial fals1t;t is had when ideas "represent that whioh.1s noth-
ing u th.ough it ware something, n 17 
r. PI J 
13Med,* m" A.T Il· VII. 43-44. 
14a~g ... A .. ,T. t" VIII. '5-;'6. 
15Keeler, p. 158. 
l~" lU,., A .. :r., VII, 4,,, 
17, 
• 
Fu:cthermore, in these confused i4eas we reo _ognize nothing 
so 'great or so $ltCellent that it seems im.pihssible that they eould 
arise from ~self. Since 'they repre.sent anti ties tr.t.at do not 
exist. we know that 'tihey proceed t%"()m nothingness; that is, they-
ooeurin us only becau.se som.th1ng is laoking in our nature, 
whioh natu.re is entirel,- per.feot. And even if then ideas should 
be trae, nevert11elese; sinoe ~he;r show me so littltl) reality t.hat 
we 08.l'll'lbt even olear~ dist1ngu1s.h the ob;jeot represented fro·m 
the non-existent. we see no reason fOr denying that these ideas 
come from o'tU"Selves. And since they are 80 derived. they do not 
come from God, as do eaar end distinct ideas; and $0 again God 
istfted from any blame o~ causing us to commit er:uors. 18 
~s tar we have seen that the imagination. t'hesenses t and 
i&8.S ee not in themselves falsEh \Vhat, th.$n; of the under-
st-'1llg? As we saw in our anaqs1a of the understanding in 
chapter 3, this f'aGulty is receptive and passive. It aa.n nei-
thel' modify nor distort the ideas wh.i.ch it r&oeiv.6. beeause 
such motilica1"ion andd:ieton1on would involve action, and h&nee 
wouldexce$d. the ea.pacity of a passive faculty. The under-
ste.n41ng merel,- eonoei'led ideas, while the will -att11."l'lS and de-
nies the..lll. For this reason no error 1s found in th. understand-
ingoonsidered in itsel.t. But the understanding is al'so unable 
to mak. mistakes because tide raoul ty, though limi. ted t is ,from 
.. i, 
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God, and, therefore, D~scart0$ concludes tr..at it must not be of 
its nature erroneous. l9 Were trlis not so t~':od would be guilty 
ot deceit. 
Now since the will in i teelf cannot be false, because it 
too is a faculty that comes from God t and ir~eed is a pertect 
tao..u.lty,20 tl'lere seems to be only one possible solution to the 
vexing problem ot error. It is in no 0.n6 of'our .faculties, nor 
in ideas in themselves. it must be oontained in some combination 
of these element.. And so it is. Error lies in the judgment, 
whioh consi.sts of the affirmation or denial on the p8.I't ot the 
will·o:f what is presented to it by the understanding. Ez'ror is 
:formally in the judgment" 
Now that wa have answered these prelindnary questior~ of 
the nature of truth and ot where fal.sity is not found, le't us 
proceed to give Descartes· complete analysis of the will in ex-
ror. 
Error,ind.eed. was quite a problem for Descartes~ He cer-
ta;l..nly could not den,y the exist6nce of many errors in the world 
of &peeulative and practical thought. As at matter of fact, the 
presence of these m.any BrI'Ors a:nd conta.'adictions in philosopr.;r 
i.sprec:i.sely what incited him to begin the Whole philosophical 
investigation anew, aXJd to devise a new m.at:lod whiah would admit 
19.~. a. A.TtI t VII, ,8. 
2OI,bid .. pp. 56-58. 
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aa;ic1; ot no el'ror, but wbich, if followed exactly, would result 
L71 8, flawless philoaophy. But it was still necessary for him to 
aocount for the o'bvious presenoe or error in tl1.6 '\vorld n.nd to 
give an explan.atiol1 tor it. As we saw, Descartes described sr-
l:'O:r:: as u a privation .... of some knowledge which it seenlS to me 
t;hat I should possess.41 21 And we als.o saw that Desoartes places 
error neither in the will nor in the understanding considered in 
themselves; so it Vias obvious for him to conclude that error 
comes from a combination of these two faculties in jUdgment.22 
This act" which uses both the general modes of thought, is an 
a.ftirmation. or den1a1 of' what i.s pa:-esented to the will by the 
understanding. 
Judgment, as we haVe seen, i8 caused by the will alone, 
sil;lce, tor one thing, a judgment consists o£ an af'firmation or 
denial, which operations are lBrtormed by the will alone. The 
part played by the undentanding is that of a conditio ~. gus. 
n2!},.23 Descartes· dootrine, how.ver, is not as complete as we 
would 11ke it to 'be t tor he leaves oertain basic questions un-
answered. For instanGe, \vhat is the relation ot the will to the 
u.tlderstanding? How is the will moved by the understanding., 
~?: 
r_;>Descartes does not use this term when ref'erI'ing to the 
IJa'rt played by the understanding in a ,judgment ,but it seems to 
rtJe a valid interpretation of his doctrine. 
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since the understanding must present 1 t with an idea, and :yet 1.& 
a passive racul ty? From the ~rip.e1R:\a we learn that th.. nIl can 
judge only when an idee. 1s presented to it by the understand1n.g~4 
but beyond this general expla.nation. Descartes does not expressly 
show how the t~vo f'aculties ~. related.. For this na.son, we m.ust 
agree with Protessor Koj7.'e when he states: nIn spite ot the im-
portant plao.e the theQry of judgment ooo.upies in the Oartesian 
system, it is an;rthing but clear. The~ terminolog is vague, the 
development fragmentary; whi~e the 1'401; that the position ot the 
problem is determined by' error and. not by knowledge i t$eU t ren-
ders the 1nterpre'be:b'1.on extraordinarily hard .. n25 
:aut in o:rd.er to underst.8f1-d the dootri.:£le. that Deaeutes 40es 
pres .• at. we must analyze bis ootPlanat1on of judgment. &pacifical .... 
17, en erroneous judgntent. basing ou.r analysis on the explanation 
of the will undertakin in the pl'.'eVious ehapt.er. fh6N we sa.w 
that the will has tYro general che.ractar.1st1os. namel~ t :Lta prop-
ert7 0.:£ being unlimited and tH$. liere. eaoh o£ these two char-
a.cteristics o.rul help us expla1n an erroneous judg,men:t. 
F11:'et ot al.l. how does the will as unl1m1 ted help ue to ex-
plain error? G04 has gi:veIl man ma.ny olear and di.stt1not idea.s, 
for eam;ple t a clear and, tistinot id.a of God t s own being as 
neoess.ar1ly exist1r..;. or Ill. clear and di$t1not ideaot o.ne' s own 
i(, l 
24~ •. t A.T .. t VIII. 18. 
a·'Keel.,J:.I, P. 149. quoting from. 1l!SC5tes ~ die ~Qnola$t1k 
(Bonn, 192~n t p. 4·8 •. 
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existence. These clear and distinct ideas, of their very ns:ture. 
cannot lead man into error. And yet even the ideas wb.j,.eh a man 
does not have in a clear and distinct manner need not :lead. him 
into error. For a mature and oareful t.hinker· oan always desist 
frc>m usent1llg to those oontused and obscure ideas. But the 
point .e w1all to make here is tbat anI,. when man eJUlenta to" 
that is" affirms or denies. an idea that 1$ not sutt1e1en.tly 
cl$@ and d.i$tinct, 08,n he er~". 26 And this event iselearly 
manta fault and in no wa:y th.e l"eaponsibility of God. I! the Wil, 
w~e 111111 t$d in its assent" sa::!. to the scope of clear and dis .... 
t1not ideas. the will would never mal'.:e a talse judgm,~t. BUt 
the real.Jil of the will is unJ.im1ted in so far as its dom.a.1n e~­
tendS: beyond the perfect use of the understanding. For, as Des-
teUs us, errors arise ffonly :tram the tact that the wil.l is 
(~ch)27 _1."e amp.le and tar-reaching than theunderst.anding, so 
that I de not restrain .it within the same liIdts but extend it 
ev.nto thOse thing$ which I·· do not understand. ,,28 
For example, I see a hOl.'se.and my idea t&11s m.e that 1 t is 
a hen!h The will enters in and asSSllts to the judgment that it 
1$ oleuly' ahorM. " ~ wtU $qAl :fhat is a horae. fhe will 
it.elf' m:a.ke.$ the att1r.mat1on. In this case I have truth. But 
i it· '~I I , 
~9 •• A.T. t • .. "I11. 17-18. 
21~ WO:t(l"b*auoouV- is not !.d.. .1t,. A. T., IX, 46.) 
as 
feund in the latin o.riginal. 
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suppOB.ing that I see .. What ~ooks like a horse. The wl..U sta;rat 
Since that ma;y or ~ not be a horae. I will make nO' jtldgmen'b 
1;;ha.t it is orUl:t~ ~th is not euotl,- had in this 08,$., but 11; 
is at least aategu,arded.. But 1t the will sa;rs in effect: Des-
pite • cO:~.ct and. ODsoure idea o:l that thing I say that it is 
ol ..... q a horse. Here we have error. It, 1n this latter case, 
tbe 'h1ng of whieh I have a.n idea really is a horN, tru.th 1s 
.ba<1 (W.ly .accidentally. But the faot to be not,.., ietllat the 
el201'(\(;t.. not come from l1t7 Qontused ul'lderf,ltand1ng t but tlNlm 1lf3' 
rQh an~ tQl11mj 1';_ will., 
But h8H agun we 11lld a laouna in DesOB-l'tes' thqUght. 
S~.tlle will is more exUl'lded than the under.tending, bow can 
it_v: in that ~. in whioh it is tml1m1ted? For this would 
• ..- ito impl7 that the will could aot without tb&. understanding. 
NO' speo1f1c solution is given to this qu.ation, though Des-
Q~ea .8._6 to· imply' i;hat tM wiJ.l is eoe:x:teMi ve w:i:ub. the 
un4ertill1;,a;wU ng 'Whc it P"s:ents .$1 th$l:' a clear ot" an ob·e.cu.re 
1<1__ F~tiher Keeler also ti.r1da Descartes' doctrine incomplete 
when he statesc 
Iu ht.e end_vo~ t;o be plain and tU'lscholaat1c t. Des-
o~.s too o~ten speaks as though he were sat1.-
tied with the old fontula. so general in most post-
AI'1$totel1an Greek schools t the mind has id&8.$ t 
t$88.~; the will assents to them a.s real, or rejeots 
them; it t~y are not quite olear, 1t ought a1.wa;ys 
be oe.ll~ed. talse. He saw well enough. vlh$n he wanted 
to, 'that ·'tiMe aocount is altogether inadequate; yet 
he .~a4t_tly deol1ned to underbQb a more searching 
anal,.i. ot the situation; and especially of the part 
that ._. t.. be ...,S1grlK 'to the intellect in the act; ot 
judgment. '*29 . .. 
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We might look a.tthis unlimited will in another way. Both 
the under$tandi.ng and will are perfeet in their own Wa;1; $0 enol' 
ean come trom neither left to themselv.ruJ, but only from the judg-
mellt wherein th\ty jointly aot. The combination of a Umi ted ,rEt-
strio1;edunderstanding w1 th an unllmi ted free will can explain 
error.;O But as long as n are content to contemplate our 
thou.ghts. without affirming or denying, we shall never err."l 
Bui; Mi$bier would ..... in this case. possess lmowledge, toX' this 
eont.plationor pB.$$1ve understanding Itis simpl,. historical 00-
onnnce. Truth and falsity oan relate only to px'Opoettlona 
Q.~ what exists Or oc.eurst not to occurene:es. :Bat the more 
_get we are to rea. knowledge. and the less exptIri..enced or 
habituated ~ are in withholding assent trom propositions pro-
po" to our minds. the more readily do we give assent where we 
~ llO1; hlly cJ.eu abont what it 1s we are ass4trting,··;2 
The Ut1derst$l1c'U.ng ean p&rc.ei ve the oontent only 8.$ :1 t 1s 
pr$sented, while the will can affirm 1 t to be wha.t it i8 not, or 
de.ny' that it is what it is. And so 'the Will is unlimited in its 
capaoi. ty toatf1rm. or deny.. In tl:d.. uneondi tional freedom lies 
the poss1b11.ity of error • 
. I 
29Ke.-.J.er, p. 1.49. 
'~d. ~M, A.T~. vn, 58. 
~l !!£H19.t A.!*. VIII. 17. 
32bellng f P. 158. 
6; 
And this leads us to the second el:lsl:a.eteris.tic ot the Ydll. 
its traedollh Descartes hQ.lds that the will is sOD1et"imes indif-
ferent. but that freedom does not oons~st in this indJ.tf'e:rence .. 33 
The mo.re the will is inolilled to a tb.ins the fraer it i$t whioh 
~sthat in the scholastt.1c 'terminol.ogy, the less indifference 
the: will had the :&10I'$ freedom. 1 t has. And since the will has 
:mo~ inclination to a clear and distinot idea. it is .tree~ whan 
a ~.@ am distinct idea is ;presented to 1 t for a judgment. 34-
On,' the other h.a.nd.. when the w111 is per.t$4tly indit'ftrent to 
ei'~,r sid.e" as happens when the idea. is oontused an4 obscure Oll 
wh.:n it is. not ~e that the idea ia olear and ·d1$titet. then 
th4/l"J.r11l bas, the lowest grade oJ: f~edo.m~35 The "Wld$~·band:i.ng 
\'.;',;" , 
iS~$t perteo.t when 1 te i4ea ;L$ elear a.Dd distill.not.· l;rhe will ia 
most, 'me Vlhen it assents to that olear and Ust1nctidea, and .1%l 
th;i.a1dEJaJ. .1udgment is. had per.f'eot truth. Thus. the more freedom 
we have from GOO. {;he les,aable we ar. to err. 
kt :here again we £ind oure.el VN uk1ng i:mpoJ:1;u.t questions 
of ,Dtacartee whioh he l.ett tulAtlSwer$d. Aeoordin8 to ·,.P$sea.rtes 
th, will. has its lowest gra4e ot freedom when it a$.e~t$ to oJ)-
&~ and oontused :ideas.. The cause of this lack or p .... feo.t 
frte<10ln is 1 ts :.tnd1fterenoe, .which seems to be the s.. as being 
, • . f~ 'n 4 .1 
unlimi ted. But when we ask DeseaJrt $S for a d1.s'b1nction between 
the wi~l as tree and as unl1.mi ted we ask in. vain. 
Our freedom 1.8 und$niab~1' used. as it should be usaG: when we 
$.Ss.nt to only what is c~ear and disti.!lct, and when we refrain 
from as.enting to what 1s only obacure.36 We are never compel lee 
tou.S$ OUl.1' .free will, and cant therefore, suspend judgmeX1t when-
ev~~ we want.. And this treedom, wlrl.ah seems to be freedoIll of 
6X'$1?O.ls. t though Descartes does not use the te.na.. is Gxe~e1sed 
b;r ,.rielding or withholding aasent. Perhaps if Desea.rtres had :ma44 
aUstinotion between fre·edom of exercise and specification, his 
4<>otr1n& 'WOuld be clearer. Aa a matter of faet, he seems to pa&1 
CV~U!, . in silencEt ~$dQnl of speo1tiee:tion, since he defines the 
o~titon 'Of the will as trtMdol'll of exereise: n~1or it oonsists 
onl.y· in tl:te 1"act tllAt we can • '" • do a gi van thing or not do it 
...... that is· to say. we oan. a.tl·ir!'J.or dany, pursue or avoid. "'57 
~. complete OUl:' analysis of the will in error,... might dis-
cua;a:brielly the two general sauro •• or error ·aecording to . 
ItM:l1llgllP In both of these causes we find the erroneous judgment 
e.a.sed by the unl.imited .and. .free nll. iJ~hese two caU$$S are, 
fir.to:! all, a precipitate judgmen.t, due to i:nsuf.fi.cient caret 
8.n4 secondlYt a prejudiced judgment. due to the toun.d.ation we 
MY. of bAbit or strong t •• llng.}8 
ft "1 ,; 'Ii' "" 
'~*~1d... pp.59-60. 
'?IIla,et~()n.~~ LaFleurt p. 51. 
'~AA,}i"""'" D ... 63 .. 
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Sometimes l'lS are ttnwillin0 to t1ak& the trouble to th1nltouJr 
and state clearly what the character of the .fact under oontem-
plation is t and so we acquiesce too readily in paasin,g ,judgment 
upon\vhat 1s on1,. more or lees clear.. In this case our ,judg-
ntent e.x:presses oonjecture a:nd not knowledge. ~r.hiliJ basty con-
jeo.ture is e.rron.eous precisely because it misinterprets a real 
character 0·1' what is g;iven in thought, the misinterpretation 
coming' from a vague awa.reneas of what is given .for interpreta-
tion. Knowledge, on the other hand, is due, 'in put at leas'b. 
to a clear discernment of what is given .for knowledge. TIle 
trouble lies in the fRet that we can affim or deny w"l thout ro-
stri'Otion, as of'1:;en as we ehoose; even Itthen WEll do not cl.ear:ly 
underatandw!:lat we are atfirming or denying t whleh is not in-
frttqu,ent. The obvious solution to this state 01: at.fa.:lrs is to 
re:tw:Je: to judge on anything we do not clearly und$rstend",.39 
lJ.1J:t~ $0coOO gl:lneral c.ause for error lies. in apH;jUdic..d 
jud.gment. nue to vanity, we may hesita.te to suppose we lack 
knOlVledge of those e()!1.~lOn matters wideh the maj ori tyof men 
oW •. to possess. Or we lray be re-luetant to aoeept a proposl-
tionthat is aotually true, beoause it aont11cts with some be-
11*£ we bold as certain. which we do not wish to admit as false. 
Then again, a proposition is not true merely because 1t is at ..... 
.fU.'med to be so by the generality of mtllDkind, beeatlae tr.ds m&'-
p.' ., 
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jorlty is no lesa pr~1pitate in its ju.dgments than w. This 
general agreement is not su!ticie.nt to make a proposition true; 
. and. W$, therefore .. , Dlustchec:t our strong inclination to believe 
it1llltil we ourselves have verified 1t/l-O What we Blust do 1s to 
n take aX'n1S against these i.nsidious forms o.f rashness and bias 
in. ju.dgment. ney,er afti:rmiIl{j w!:m.t we do not know to be certainly 
true, or wl1.at is even capable of being doubte<1 .. t.41 
~Q sum UPt than, Deacarti6s' 6JC,Position of $XTOr, we tind 
that error is not a. real thing but a privation. ihere.t'ore, it 
nei ther comes from God, nor does God concur j.n it.. ~I' is not 
fouurl in the iriie.gination, nor 1n the sellses. It is not found in 
c;leeJi'an.d distinct ideas either .fomal~y or Jaater1ally, although 
6r;£'Ot' can be round in contused ideas in the sense that they ot-
fQ to the nIl the ingr(!l.a.ienta, as it wax-iii,. ot a .tala. judg-
ment"t . A:.P..d. $0 confue$d ideas axe Sfdd to be ma"bu1:ally .false. 
031~iOe l\l.ei thor the will nor the Ullde~at:andi,ng. in th.u~.lv •• t are 
s:ru,,:t>~.et 1;0 ~Z~t this privat.ion in us. can only be ;f'ound.1n an 
aot wh:i.oh coIabines tIl.es. two .taeulti$cllh This act is ju~entt 
by which the wi11 a.£tiJ."lI1s or denies what is presented to it .~ 
tb.tt und.eZ's tanding. 'uthough God has given U$ thbse t#O .facul-
-ui-, •• we can in no wa7 blwne Him. .tor causing our flIrrO'I"S, s;i.ne& 
er~~stems from a misl4se of O't.lr taouJ.t;y of rill1n.g. ~s for-
mal aJld p.t."oxima'b$ eause 'Of Vl.'Or, the misus·e of our unlimited. 
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frttedOm.. a.r1aea trom. the vuious remote aotl..rces .. name],yt that we 
aoquire prejudices in chl.ldhood, and are hardly able to forget 
shout them in lat~~ 111'e; 'Ghat we become fatigued easily when 
cOllcantrating, especially on tJlose ob.jects which are not sensi-
ble; and that we attaoh our thoughts to wows whic.h do net ex-
press 't.MXll \vi th accuracy .. 
And :firJally t wnat is the role ot the will in elwor? We so 
above that error exi eta formally only in jud~t.. And fl:om the 
natve '01' the will and' Ullderst&1l.d1ng we can easily see wby the 
will alone makes the judgment. The uruit:u."'Standing iSl.'estrict$4 
re:b:hu Ua.:.tTowl;r. since the l'a.:ng.e ot propositions it can contem-
plate is quite lim1 ted. Although it can contemplate ~Llan;y things 
obscurely and eontus$dl;y t the number of those things it call 
~$tand e.learly and d.iutinotly is s.ma.ll" To the will, hQw-
.vu,. 13 given no assig!l$.ole lim1t~ It can a.f1'l.1:m OZ' (;leny 
Vlbtt~ the propositious be oleaX' or oosoW?e. It is p:t"'ti'cisely 
in th1$ unl:l m:i t:$O. w111 that w ue .0 susoeptible 'to ewor. 
When the 1.de:u, even obscure ones, are lller"elyGOlltenlp~at$d by 
the 'UMersta:Q.d.ing", we have noe,rror. But villfUl 'the will becom.es 
rash and usents to t!leaeideel.$, it 18 misusing its !l?e$doIll, 
~by to~g a mistakenjudgm.llt. 'ffnile it is a misuse ot 
.t'r •• do~ that condemns us to in.numerable N:'ro;t's, 1t is a proper 
'US:e of this i;l.'ee4.Olllthat saVfta us fx'Om. $3:'ro.'.. Fox we are using 
.f'aedoXll, correet17 when we &1 tMr assent to clear and distinct 
1deu:.,o:r Whe!l we .retuse toobaoure ones. Thus, the 
deliver us from it. 
OlUTI01 SY 
NOW tXl-at we ha:V'$ oonsidered just what Descartes held on er-
1."'O;r:, a.:nd. how he solved tho problem by the use or the Will, we 
are ready to give a.n (Waluation. This evaluation will oonsist 
ina double critic1s.m, a.s we point-ed out in the introduct1Qn., 
We shall tr,y, first ot all. to 'point out t:t~e two in.ternal dir-
fic~ties in Desoartes· use of' the will in error, and then the 
en!ernal ditticu.ltif);s. This secoll.u o1'i ticisItl ·~ll be a oompari-
son' of Desoartes t position with that oi.~ fit. ThoL'la.s. 
But b&tore we prooeed. to the two internal inconsistencies 
we tind in .Desoartes· position, it "V'culd be well to refer to the 
om1ssions we found in the previous chapter. Th!.n"e we discovered 
that Descartes left unanswered .'number of 'basic qU$s:tii.OD.S, 
whieh"U answered by him t would have made his doctrine more in-
telligible. or would have shown him, that his doctrine needed re-
y,ia1on. ConeeJ.~ 'bhe relation ot the wi.ll w1 th the unde.r-
at.$nQ,:i;ng we saw that two1mportant quest1oll$ were Zeft unsolved. 
First ot all. bQw is the will moved by the understanding? See-
omUy,. how can tb.e wi.ll opel:'ate ;in that area in wb.ic.h.1t is more 
extena.1.ve t,ha;n the undsrstanding? COnoerning the n.atu~e of the 
will _ found two other problems left \l.l'lSettled. Fi.l~at of all, 
?O 
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what is the distinction between the will as unlimited and the 
will as tree? s$Oondly, is their any liberty of specification 
in the will? These omissions seem to make Descar1ies' dootrine 
at the will, and speelfieally of theall in error, le.s intel-
ligible, it not incorrEtet. 
Now let u.s cliseuss the two internal illCoJllSistencies present 
in D&soartes' expl8.tlation of the will in error. The two ineon-
siE)'bencie. or contra41ct1ons we find are: (1) that he mcplioitly 
explained error as a. judgment otthe will. But in truth, he 
seems to be t.irtven to make jwlgment an ao1'i of the undestand;1.nea 
and (2) that the basic purpose in his explanation ot error was 
to :ere. God .from an:r blame 1neausing our errors. But in th. 
fin41 .. lye1 •• he oannot help but plaee the blame on God, to 
80m. ~ntt no matter bOw mueh t1118 is against his pious Cath-
0110 1iemperulen.t. 
yu-.t of all, then, we shall p'oint out that error is due to 
an impI;'opell use ot the und&rstand1ng an4 not Qr the will t no mat 
'f.;' •• how much Descartes would have it otherwise. we mean that 1t 
is dU(i to the 'UtJ.d.erstand.ing .ven in rd. system., "It _s Des-
ca»t .... int&nt1on originall,. to show that error 1s directly due 
tou lmproper use ot our unlimited tre.a.om in will1ng, but the 
conclusion to whiGh he is in pQ1nt of tact eventually driven 1s, 
that 1;he UN is ·improper· preaisely because of a def'ect-not in 
our vdll. but in our undarstand1ng. For, though to yield assent 
to)!ihai; .iSODS01.tee or contused is to abuse our freedom of .S,.tl, 
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B!!1eutauMBs. ,,1 No one will deny that the understa;nd.ing alone 
is l:'espolls1ble for apprehending axqtJ:dng obsourely.. "Ths.t whioh 
a contu.sed idea is 'of', * is never intrinsioallY' sueh that. 1.t it 
18 peree1ved at all. it must be eon.fukledly or obscurely per-
oeived.. It 1.8 alway. intrins1oally. suoh that, unless the faoulty 
oonoe.nQea. in its apprehension is defective, :1:t must be olearly 
and. distinctly perceived. ~e confusion or Qbacurity :hn the 
idea is not, therefore. due to the thing of w~oh ""he idea i! 
an 1d.&* ,,2: 
_t it there weN no oocasion in which we ought to withhold 
the assent in order to aVQid error. that is t, it we bad no eoru-
fusta. ~r o'bacure ideas., then 'VlOU,ld be no possibility or error • 
.And tlO Keeling oonolude. _ "Bo. 'to Descartes t s d101rum t.b4:t in 
Willing alone _ are responsible for enar, we mu.st ~. the re-
seJ:'Va:t;:1on tbat our detective (oon.tusri) a.pprehension 18 oertainl, 
an aeeelulory before the fact J "3 
S1n¢$ the understanrHng ;1.s passive. aocording to Desoartes, 
anJUogous to a pi-ace of wax ~() • .1ving impressions or a. nd .. rror 
re.tleeting 1.mages ,it is inoapabl$o~ .tomning as.y'nthes.1s of 
10.'.8" let alon. pronouncing them tne or :tuse.. Tb.1s act iS t 
~.t"ONf exercised by the nll. HOQver, aa Keeler objeots, 
• F ,. ,. t $' " 
" 
"it 1s one thing to marko1f in general 'terms th1.$ ~_ •. op-
position b&tween pass1'Ve and active faculties, and quite anotn.r 
to take it .in all ser1ollsnass. Descartes hi.msel.t never under-
st'ood it s~ctly, nor aee:epted. 'the psychology it would baV$ led 
to. In sp1~ of ~6rtain out-ot-th.-'Uia7 positions he was oar-
r1ed to by th. strong \Uldel!'~ent of Tolun:ta.l'1sm in hi.s other-
Yd. •• tnt;elleotJual1st ph1,losop~t th.e fur.t.da.memtal d1..tt .... ne$ 
beW.- inveUeet an4 w111 remal.ned for him wh9.t it .htIld b-een tor 
iFh$:SchQolmen, the torm ... ie 1th& ftilOUlty or the un., tn. 1&t-
tel ~t of th6 go04.·4 D$scutes takes tor gran:ted ~.'t the 
ju4gment is the proper seat of t.ruth. and that the "e:t:'J" purpose 
Of ph11oaopitLeal studj" 1$81';0 41~tthe mind to'ff8J!d tll. ellun~ 
c1at1ono~ sound end coxwrect j~lltson all mattersth.toome 
_~o,.. i1h l.' FOl:'this ••• on Keeler oonelude. ttbA" tlj:ud.gmen:t 1e 
t01it ¥m . p~l17 uact .:f' t:U unaeratantiing'. however lI'luch he 
mtq'.~_ to 1'$f~tQt:he all., "0 
·The· naSon tOft th1. ua.rti.on is cl.ar. Aft1:r.ming and deny. 
.i.ng have f;6 de w:ttb. ath1n8 being Sf) Gl1 not so. andths.$ two 
se'. OamlDt 'be :l'e4uoed to til mere ~u1:nS or shunning because 
.~ •• aota restllNl. 8f,)od and &v11. It is evident to ullthat we 
of1Jen aff1l!".l1t when .. rtal17 f •• l nothing but aver.ion, .and that 
4 belel", p. 164. 
~e:ne a.n4 Roa., P. 1 .. 
6'a/:""' .... 1· . ., I:!h ~ 8r, Pi ,L.C"t'., 
7'+ 
nega.tion can be oa11ed shunn1ng"only 0,. a transparent me1;a-
phQx-.-.7 Descartes tells Gas5t.lndi that "quia ita vis, ita 3Udi-
08S ••• 8 ifhis is true enough. but prov •• only that judging and 
believing 41"8 $U.bjeot to the 1~luence o£ the will, ·tiUld not that 
they ~ essentially acts of that faculty. 
,. 
Aceoltding to Ketle;!;", Gilson was not exaggerating when he 
~te that t 'tin s.pite of the seemingly contrad1otory texts that 
oan, ,b~o;l.1iedt it r$mai.na true to say that the Oartes1an ooncep-
ti.QIl .o.t the ;r$l.at1on between intellect and Will i8 a'boottom 
tbat o! 8t.. 'J;lhomas h.;1.msltlf. It 9 In other words, the undepstand1ng 
not the will, iJu.dsea. 
The a.conl. 1nvemalinconaistency. tind in his doctrine 
is t~t » •• oarte. does not prove what he starte4 out to prove. 
One, ofbia ma1n objeot1 V$S in his lengthy &xp~a.nelt1on oienor 
wa.$ •. ·.to P~c. all blame for error on ourselVes, none on God. 
Ttd.s.~· baa not done. Descartes would SUPPO$.tha.t sine. God 
ia so good.. 40 honest t He could be !lei ther a dece! Vel.' nor wish 
to .... CAU •• our eXlTOr$ in ~~. lJ!heratoh. we are the adequate 
~~s o£ our .n»N~ But thi.s al.:t .... good God m.akes it ",en more 
di~.f'1cult '10 t:D';pla.in our en:ors, no .. easier.. Why is i'lt that an 
al~.powp.fu.l G04, who endOWed us with per.tee1i .. ld.llsshould not 
7~&A. 
~siI, A ... ~." X, 559. 
:X. 84tl.,. l64. quoting G.ilson, l4\lriber t { .9!!U. DesSlI:£t81 .u 
1!t_loQ~ (Paris, 191;), p. 265. . 
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be held responsible tor permitting obscure and contus$d ideas in 
ou..r 1.lll'de~st:an<l1ng t when He 4ou~d have easily created us vd:tb. an 
un4~and1ng unifo~mly olear in its oparation?lO 
Das~G1iJ f as we saw. tried to answer this dif.tioul t;r t and 
414 .... 1" it to his own aat1.sfactioll.., by sa.y1.n8 t'll&tthe under-
s't..,.1t1g lao! its nature tin1 te, that 1s, there are lllaIl.1' t.h1ngs 
~ it cannot eomprehena.11 Keel1ngrep11ea to 'this by saying 
"But. 11iaat be ob~eflte4. whetker or no God 18 responsible for 
llAv1.ng endQ_d, finite selves w,i1ih understanding llm1t~ in l"ea-
peot to theeUtll,;tf ot 1ihei.J:" knowledge, Heo,artainly does aeem to 
ber:espons1ble (notwi th.aiianding D •• cartes t s denial) tor endowing 
us with un4entandings,.wb.1eh, STen ¥f1:!iB!n the ;t'e,stricted ranges 
otthe:1r {)Qlllpetence, shoUld all too often prove :1.neompetent 1 
Even "though we could not have cogn1:tions of ev~ng thJtt 1s 
tb. .. t1,oally knowable t wl:Qr $bould 80 m.any t or 8.1.J.Y, o·t, the COS-
nitlons our o<>nst1tutioD.$ do permit us to Mve. 'be uncl.ear ·atld 
QOnt\l.fI41n12 
As w. saw., theae eo::n.f'l.Uted and obecure 1dea.$ come ..trom see-
on~ qual! ties.. W'hi.eh are CQn.tu.sad precisely beeaus* of Des-
ca,r1;as' d1eiloto.n17 between body- e;nd soul. It hi. thec.1.7 of ar-
rorWflre not subdeeted t<> tiM.£! buic pJ:incipl.t it does not see 
IJ I.!"; i'" :. t J 
l°Ke.ling, p.. 270. 
11 
.. · !d..!!, A .. If 1;, VII" 60. 
~K$.UnB. p. 210, footnote. 
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that he would have tal len i.nto error on. this poi:ttt. He did not 
want tc blame those obscure ideas on God, and. so he said that 
the.,. cue from himself,. But they could come tram him. tor either 
0,1" tWQ reason.!,. E1thel. ... !U.s nature was defeotivet or there was 
aome.bing lacking in the natu~. of things. Wllicheve.;t' 110m of 
the dl1emma Descartes takes, he must. it seems.. place the: b.lame 
'lo~ tba.t deficiency on God in some way or other. 
He waf;; so obsessed with the idea. that God had no part in 
this business oJ: erl"or tmat he denied that the Oreato.;r was eve-n 
giving His coneur;r®oe to, er1'Or. If Descartes had seen the dis-
tine1;.ion between the ent1 ty ol an. act and j. ts tale:i ty t he wou.ld 
have lUore' easily solved his problem, and still saved the iUlnc,-
1;:ity 'otGod. 
New we eom.. to the ,final aspect ot our or! tie1sm of Detl.... " 
o~.s doctrine of the will in error. l'te shall try to show that 
his pol81t1011 is unsa:tisfactory fol." a nutnber of reasona which 
"" c:1t.e4 ill the introduetol.7 chapter. 
1) ~ .ei.rltt pOi,i~t wtfpha.ll tak. up for C1"i tic1sm u the 
u.el.'tion th-.t the understanding iamerel;.y passive" W. have 
stZlt.$$ed this basic Goncept in Desca.:rrbes' doctrine, aQ we need 
no1;explain his position here. IJ$t it su..ffice. by ws:y of crit-
ic1_ to show that the understanding is n.ot me.t:'ely pas.sive t bu.t 
act1p as well. 
1;1; ieelear that our ll"ltelleot is in some way passive be-
cause .. 8t;~ Q.rt.with nothing, that is, we at one time do not 
?? 
know something, and at another do. Our knowledge does not 
chang., the thing known, but in some wa:y it ohanges us. Since tM 
intellttct (pos.s1b.le) is passive, in pot~ney. it must be actuated. 
The possible intelleot cannot be aotuated or informed by itself, 
at least not in so far as it is in potency. nor can it be ao-
tuated by innate id.eas. It oannot be inf'ormed by some external 
ews$: such as an intuition of God, the senses alone. or by some 
a:reated thing such as 9. 'WOrd. a. teacher, etc. The only thing 
lett: is that it is aotuated by some act. whioh is also an intel-
lectual i'a..(ftll1'sy. ~1s operation we give to the agent intellect. 
Wa need not go into tl1e part pla.yed by the phantasm. or the im-
pressed and. ~S8ed species. Suffioe it to say that the in-
tellect cannot be merely passive, since we must have some active 
t'ac.ult,.to inform the :possible intellect, to move it from pot.n .... 
cy t. act. 
Wh~S,t. Thomae deserilH~s the operation ot the intellect he 
meftly __ alts down the word 1n.t!l11i:s~l". etymologically t and eon .... 
elua..st"bat 110 understand 1$ a. prooess by which ona Hinterius in 
1pqrei ea"Sentia veritatem quodammodo legit.ul~ This process, 
o1:>v1ously, cannot be }ullrformed by a faculty that 1$ passive 
allOtlfh 
We ~a..'1al$o discovtlr tht natUl'.'e of the intelJ.eet as an 
operative faoulty from the natu:r.-s.l appetite of the intellect and 
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from i 1:;8 dynamic chuacter.. Ita dy'namia eharaoter is ev.idenoe4 
in. the pursuit of lmowi:n.g; the ~:;6e.rch for solutions .and 1n~ 
sight$1 the striving to make thin.get aotua.lly intelligible .. wh1~b. 
is the characteristio o£ the agent ihte.lleot. 
2) Next.. let us discuss Deac8.l. ... tes' assertion that truth is 
in the Will. Although his poSition on truth is not the p.l?imaxr.y 
COllCe~ or this thesis. still .. an underatand1r.J,g on his mistak. 
in ttn.s point will l'l'lake it olearer why he failed to explain ex--
Nt' satistaotori.ly. 
The question of supnme imponanee concern.ilng truth is: In 
which .faault,' is it found? Descartes protests that it is in 
the will because tIle understanding if; passive. Both the con-
tention a.nd the reason to.it" it must be denied. Truth is f.ou.nd 
tbat operation ot the mind .in which that vthi~h is known about a 
thillg is .referred to the t.h1ng formally. And, obV1ou.s·qt th1s 
opera:u1on can takeplaoe only in the judgment of the intel.lect. 
When the intelleot ;judges that a thing known oonfoX'm8 .'1#0 the 
£o~ whi.ch it apprehends about that thing. then it first knows 
and ~r(f8SeS truth. This it does by composing or di:riding. 
_1; iS t it either applies to or .remOTes from the tll1ng sign!-
f~_ by the subject Qj.' a Pl"Opoe1ti.on.8ome torm s1gn.lt1ed by 
'till. ~ica.te.15 
;) Th1s the.i.a b.as been an uplanat10n ot Descartes· doc-
" ii, t!: .~ ( I I" ) ! 
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tr1.ne of the will in erI"~. We bave seen that error occurs when 
the w.ill affirms or deni.a what 1$ not clearly and d1.a"t1netly 
perceived. But aeaording to St. Thom8.serror 1s found in the 
judgaumt of the intellect undu the influence ot the will. 
S;Lnoe .e pointed. out in 8. pr8'ri.ous point ot or1:ticiaxn (2) that 
th.3~t is not in the will a8 Descarte. held, and sinoe we 
w.Ul point ou.t in aauoseq:u.ent point of er1'1o.1sm (4) tbat ob-
;.I.-tiv. eV1denc.e1s tbe criterion tor truth. it will be rather 
euJ' to show the rel.at1onah1p between the will and 1ntelleet in 
~orf We m1.ght point out agun that DesoflX"bes t&11ed to demon-
Bt3te this rellJ.";lonsh1p 1..n. hi. system. 
neso,mes. of course. agrees that error 1$ .found in ;:Judg-
ment,because heN alone •• have atf1mat1on or negation. whioh 
opel'!a:tion8 can only beplaoed by the will sinoe tha't fa.eul..,. of 
'bbe m1n4 is alone act1p. It h$. baA not pos1ted the fut that 
t.lle u.n.a..rsta.n41ns is passive, perhaps he would not have fallen 
:Ln.o th1$position of making judgment an act of the wrong t8.4u1-
t7. 
But we know that in an UTOliilU)U8 judgmen'bthe ln1a'tlleot at-
tr1l:m.tes a :toa to somethins wh1chthat thing d08. no" bave. or 
donJ,u to somoth1ng a1orm. wi:d.oh it doe. bav.. Btlt wh$t part 
do_ 'Uhe wil.l pl.a;r? In a 'trUe judgmenttlUl intellect is moved 
'byob.j:.otive evtdence. But in an erroneous judgment there is 
not sutfioiet evid<tnee because W'Mit 1s talse cannot 1lO".. Ue 
intel.l •• tob;Jeotively, since it is not objective.. 1!.b.erefo~et we 
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need something elae to lllove the 1ntellect, and this some'tb1ng 
else oan only be· the will. The intellect cannot determine it-
aelf f $ince it is not a free pot4ulCY. Therefore, it is moved 
by the will. which 1s in man the principal moving power. 
AoeordJ.J:Jg to !~itain fthwnan .rror is caxplained tor Des-
cat1ies J.n the sue wa;y as theologians uplai.n ang.el:Lc error; I 
"an, mo_ PJl'8ei"~t t.bat the Cartesian theoZ7 ot enor, so 
little oonsistent with hi. position, would only become coherent 
ana. logical. 11 one brought 1io it. with au1table emen4&t1on. the 
cu. 01' the errors ·of f·allen epl.r1 ts.. l?eeipi .cy of jude; ... 
mel';!:tHtt16 v~ an e.n(Iel ~t he apprehends an objeot clearly .. 
\Vb., he 1.Dq)etru.Qus17 6X.'tenda h1s affirmation beyond What he U,l1-
d.~.t4l'lda and fP.v$S a pJ* •• lp111ate US$nt, it is because of his 
will.. Man af.tirma Ot' denitts, aecording to. Descartes, beyond 
~ •. .be etear1:rand tU.st1no:t17 peNeiv-es, from a \Ve~$s in hi 
tr .. _llt from all impetuosity for whioh bie will is solely Na 
potl.albl •• 
4) .le was unti.oned in the introduct.1on an<l ~_:t'$d. to 
maV'$1mes i.n tiM body ot this thesis, De.cut •• • olt1.tu1on of 
.. nth 1s ael.u and dist1llct idea. If we have a olea.r and d1 
1d.no1; idea ofaome1Jll1113 t tiha t idea 18 neoe.saril,. tru... It 1.s 
t:l;4a $ubjao1t1ve olarity which 1s fQ,:: De.canes that wbien movet3 
thew1.11 to a.a_t. 
It: 1sg~od to note t however, that in mak1.ng elea.rnesa of 
. I"' ( 1 
ofeOU86J, ooulld find nothing like obj~et1ve evidence, because 
wha:t his understanding knew was the idea and not the thing. 
5) It is rather obvi ou II that Deseartcu~ t in his solution to 
the question of error, has oontused consent with 9;88$11t. It 1s 
in thi8 con.tu.s1on, perhaps, 'that the best retutat10n of voli-
tional 3udgment is to be found. For assent and oonsent are es-
sentially d1!terent. ltThe former,» as Father Ulaher points out,. 
:ltl. intellectual. acquiescence in something as t.,rue; the latter 
i:lvolUlltal:'7 Mmpl.aoellC';1 in sOlneth.ing as ~ •• 17 i'hi.$ 1s only 
to sq that the f01".l'n&1 objeot ot the understanding is the true. 
while 'bhe forsaai object of the will is the good. Now s.ineein 
j~ents. the truth is being Bought. 1t is eVident that the w111 
ean ha¥& no foI1lt(f.l part. 1n their formation • 
. '6) Let us point ~t uso that the vdll oannot be moved b7 
an:r .n .. :t.'t1tll ettie1ent c_use, In order to be free, the will 
mu$t $Oft 1 tselt • Jut Desoartes would. have 'the will being most 
~"Wh_ it is mo$'b determined. which seems to be a. contradic .... 
tion. !l'he lntellEtct cannot b. the eff'leient cause of the will t 
beOau.e it 1$ the formal cause. It the thing known by the in-
t_ll.Ht ":t"9 an Ubixe4 goed.. e.g., the Deatit1e Vision. then 
th.$·ull would be necessitated. But in th1ecase the till would 
oe~ not; be free.. NoJ.- 1s the will tree concerning the good 
ingneral, sinee this is lts formal o"btfect, and no ;faculty can 
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be indi.tte~ent to ita formal object. In other words .. there are 
times when the will 1$ free and indiffer.nt, and times when it 
is determined. But to say .. as Descartes does t that it oould be 
both at the same time would olearly b. .. contradiction. 
7) Desc8.l:'tes, 8S we saw, repGe.tedly denied that God. had 
a.nyt~to do with .rror. For this reason he denied even the 
ooneurrenee ot GOd in an erl"Oneou8 act. Mereq sayi."\g that er-
l'O~ is a. priva.tion, hOwever. does not leave God out of the p1c-
~. i()~. eat is a privation is something, and is a privation 
l.nSO tar d 111 is %+otall that it $hould be. Therefore, God 
lJlUlilt conour in such an act" 'because this act is a being t a. oon-
tins~'lf b.~ll$' and all beings depend upon God u their efficient 
cautiJe,,,,, fhi,s does J?ot meant however, that God is the author ot 
e~~. QU,1te the contra.ry. The a.e1i comes from God insofar u 
it!s .. 'b.'irlg, ·antt 1n t.h1. respeot it 1$ good. The act <ilomes 
trom lMUl 1nao far l!l$ it is this being l and in this respEII,at it 
is er~neous or evil. 
To sum up Descartes' doctrine in a sentence t wetind that 
eXTOl: ie a privation proceeding from the judgmen.t, wh1ch1s an 
8.4$.,0! the will af.t1ming a:r denying what 1,$ pres~ted to it by 
tb.tl 1.U.l.d.:erstanding., But for therea.8ona stated a.bove. this posi-
t:1.0;l, i$ untenable. We W01.l.l4 .ratheit' otfer th1B solution: Error 
is, .' positive di.etiOrt10tl prooeed,ing from "he ju4gment ot the in-
tel18G~t moved b.1 the Will in lieu o£ objective eVidence. 
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